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A B S T R A C T 
 The aim of this review is to discuss recent arguments and findings in the comparative study of empathy. Based on a multidisciplinary 
approach including psychology and ethology, we review the non-human animal literature concerning theoretical frameworks, methodology, 
and research outcomes. One specific objective is to highlight discrepancies between theory and empirical findings, and to discuss ambiguities 
present in current data and their interpretation. In particular, we focus on emotional contagion and its experimental investigation, and on 
consolation and targeted helping as measures for sympathy. Additionally, we address the feasibility of comparing across species with 
behavioural data alone. One main conclusion of our review is that animal research on empathy still faces the challenge of closing the gap 
between theoretical concepts and empirical evidence. To advance our knowledge, we propose to focus more on the emotional basis of 
empathy, rather than on possibly ambiguous behavioural indicators, and we provide suggestions to overcome the limitations of previous 
research. 
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1. Introduction 
There is wide agreement in both scientific and folk conceptions that empathy is 
a skill of central importance for human sociality and group cohesion (Decety, 
2015). Broadly speaking, empathy allows us to respond to and even 
experientially share the feelings of others, and thus to better understand and 
relate to their inner emotional and mental states (Singer and Lamm, 2009). 
Apart from fostering smooth and efficient coordination and communication, 
empathy has a strong impact on prosocial behaviour, such as when we help and 
support others whose suffering and needs we resonate with (Decety, 2015; 
Lamm et al., 2019). In these ways, empathy may act as a social glue that not 
only ties us together as individuals, but also is essential for building and 
maintaining the complex societies that humans have evolved to live in. 
Naturally, if this claim is correct, it raises the questions of where this complex 
skill comes from (in evolutionary terms), and whether other species, who also 
rely to a great extent on living and cooperating in large groups of individuals, 
possess empathic skills similar to those ascribed to humans. By pursuing a 
comparative approach, through investigating empathy’s related phenomena in 
different species, the major aim of the present review and opinion paper is to 
shed some light on these questions. We begin our review with an overview of 
the definitions of human empathy, and how these may relate to and inform 
comparative research on empathy. In that section, we also discuss current 
theoretical frameworks of animal empathy and their applicability for 
interpreting empirical data. This is followed by extensive discussions of three 
major empathy-related phenomena, namely emotional contagion, consolation, 
and targeted helping (see Table 1 for definitions used in this paper, terminology 
often used in other literature, and empirical examples of the phenomena). Each 
of these phenomena will be introduced by their definitions and theoretical 
foundations, followed by an examination of empirical approaches used to 
investigate them. We build our discussion of these approaches on specific 
conceptual issues, and we draw upon selected empirical examples to support 
our arguments. Hence, the reviewed literature is not exhaustive, and the cases 
used intend to include diverse species, methods, and paradigms. For each 
phenomenon, we consider the question whether the empirical data may indeed 
reflect the existence of the particular phenomenon in the respective species, or 
whether a more parsimonious alternative explanation should be considered. As 
will become clear throughout the paper, we would like to argue that in some 
empirical cases there may be an oversimplification of the discussed 
phenomenon, and that interpretations sometimes lack conclusive validation 
(methodologically as well as conceptually), being based on rather indirect or 
ambiguous evidence. With this review and opinion paper, we want to raise 
awareness of how and when the label empathy is used, and how empathy-
related phenomena are currently being investigated in comparative research. 
 
1.1. Human empathy 
Historically, empathy research has been driven by two related questions, “How 
do we understand others’ feelings?” and “How does that knowledge lead to 
actions of care for the other?” (e.g. Batson, 2009). The first question concerns 
the experience of empathy itself and the second focuses on the behaviour that 
follows from that experience. Many scholars have come up with their own 
definition, by putting emphasis on both or either one of these questions. This 
has led to ongoing disagreement on how to best define and measure this 
complex and multi-faceted construct, and its numerous sub-concepts and their 
complex interlinkages (e.g. Batson, 2009; Singer and Lamm, 2009; 
Yamamoto, 2017). One of the major challenges hampering scientific progress 
in empathy research is this conceptual and empirical elusiveness, which does 
not only concern research on humans but also on nonhuman animals 
(henceforth animals). In the human literature, Daniel Batson critically 
reviewed eight empathy related phenomena (2009) (see Box 1 for all 
phenomena and their description). While these phenomena, ranging from 
emotional contagion to sympathy, carry distinct definitions, he outlines that 
researchers in various fields have repeatedly referred to “these things” as 
empathy. In a similar vein, a recent review uncovered 43 distinct definitions of 




Table 1: Empathy and related phenomena. 
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Term Definition Other used terminology Empirical examples 
Mimicry 
A copying of another’s physical appearance (Zentall, 
2001). The copying is an involuntary, automatic and fast 
response of the physical or behavioural traits of others 
(Chartrand and Bargh, 1999) 
Motor mimicry1 (= Body posture 
mimicry + Facial mimicry); 
Synchronization (of expressions, 
movements, postures, or vocalizations) 
Batesian mimicry (Ohsaki, 1995);  
Rapid facial mimicry (Palagi et al., 2019a, 2019b) 
Behavioural Contagion Two or more animals show similar, species-typical 
(unlearned) behaviour (Thorpe, 1963). The behaviour in 
one animal is automatically triggered by the similar 
behaviour of others (Zentall, 2001) 
Motor contagion1 Contagious stretching (Gallup et al., 2017); 
Contagious scent-marking (Massen et al., 2016); 
Yawn contagion (Massen and Gallup, 2017); 
Coordinated movements in courtship displays (Tinbergen, 1960); 
Coordinated movements in antipredator behaviour, such as seen in 
flocking or herding (Zentall, 2001), or mobbing (Hoogland and 
Sherman, 1976) 
Emotional Contagion Emotional state-matching of a subject with an object 
(de Waal, 2008) 
Vicarious emotion; Emotional transfer; 
Emotion transmission; Affect matching; 
Affective empathy; Emotional replication 
Contagious laughter (Provine, 1992);  
Positive emotional contagion (Reimert et al., 2017);  
Negative emotional contagion (Adriaense et al., 2019a) 
Personal distress A self-oriented, aversive emotional response (Lamm et al., 
2007) 
Vicarious aversive or negative arousal Spread of distress in infant monkeys (de Waal, 2008) 
Empathy The ability to respond to and experientially share the 
feelings of others, which eventually leads to a better 
understanding of their inner emotional and mental states 
(Singer and Lamm, 2009). See also Box 1 and Box 2. 
Often described as feeling with or feeling 
as the other (distinct from the feeling for, 
which defines sympathy or compassion) 
Empathy for pain (Singer et al., 2004; Rütgen et al., 2015) 
Sympathy An emotional response and concern about another’s state, 
including attempts to ameliorate this state (de Waal, 2008) 
Sympathetic concern; Empathic concern; 
Compassion; Consolation. Often 
described as feeling for the other. 
Consolation (Burkett et al., 2016; Quervel-Chaumette et al., 2016) 
Perspective Taking A mental process that enables to take another's perspective 
and relate to other’s emotions, thoughts and intentions 
(Decety and Svetlova, 2012) 
Cognitive empathy; Theory of Mind See Massen et al., 2019 (This special issue) 
Targeted helping Help based on the cognitive appreciation of the situation or 
needs of others (de Waal, 2008) 
Prosocial behaviour Giving access to food (Warneken and Tomasello, 2006);  
Handing a tool (Yamamoto et al., 2009);  
Rescue behaviour (Bartal et al., 2011; Hollis and Nowbahari, 2013) 
Definitions of empathy related phenomena as we use them in text. Other used terminology refers to other terms researchers have used as synonyms or closely related phenomena. Empirical 
examples are selected studies on the topic. 1 The terms motor mimicry, motor contagion and behavioural contagion are often intermittently used (e.g. Hess and Fischer, 2014), though by 
definition mimicry and contagion are different.
 
Within this set of definitions, the authors identified eight themes that form the 
major distinctions between these definitions, and propose an updated definition 
of empathy (see Box 2). Hence, somewhat ironically, human empathy research 
is now facing (at least) 44 different definitions and 8 distinct conceptual themes. 
These complexities in theoretical and methodological understanding naturally 
translate to the animal domain. There, on top of the challenges in human 
research, most measures of emotion and cognition are indirect and have to rely 
predominantly on behaviours observed in animals - while research in humans 
benefits from potential disambiguation via self-report (although not without its 
own issues, see e.g. limitations in self-report in Winkielman and Berridge, 
2004). These intricacies not only apply to empathy defined as an umbrella term, 
but also to its subcomponents, such as seen for instance in self-other distinction. 
Self-Other (S-O) distinction (also labelled ‘S-O recognition’) is the ability, and 
awareness, to differentiate between one’s own feelings and the other’s (Lamm et 
al., 2019), which for example is important to decrease personal distress in order 
to help others. The Mirror-Self-Recognition (MSR) test has been suggested as a 
way to test S-O distinction in animals (Gallup, 1970), with evidence of MSR in 
humans and great apes (Anderson and Gallup, 2015), yet, further demonstration 
in other species has been proven challenging. For example, despite advanced 
cognitive skills, many animals do not show MSR, such as Goffin’s cockatoos 
(Cacatua goffiniana, van Buuren et al., 2018), some methodological approaches 
to test MSR have been found questionable (see Anderson and Gallup, 2015, for 
a critical review on MSR in primates), and evidence in non-primate species (e.g. 
elephants) is often based on single individual findings (see Gallup and 
Anderson, 2018, for a review on MSR in non-primates). Moreover, it remains 
unresolved whether MSR in animals demonstrates S-O distinction or whether 
MSR can be explained alternatively, and whether S-O distinction automatically 
implies self-awareness, as disputed in a recent paper on MSR in cleaner fish 
(Labroides dimidiatus) (Kohda et al., 2019; but see de Waal, 2019, for a critical 
discussion of Kohda et al., 2019, and the application of a gradual perspective on 
MSR, rather than the current binary one). Accordingly, important distinctions 
between notions of awareness should be considered, such as the difference 
between one’s physical awareness (where one is located in space) versus one’s 
mental awareness (of one’s self as an entity) (Vonk, 2019a).  
Considering the disagreement on the empirical evidence for S-O distinction in 
animals, the presence of this distinction in a social or emotional setting seems 
an even more challenging hypothesis to test. Moreover, human empathy requires 
a flexible regulation between self and other (affective and cognitive) 
representations, which then again may not always be accompanied by congruent 
and overt emotional responses. All these elements remain a major challenge to 
demonstrate in animals (e.g. see for dogs, Canis familiaris, Boch and Lamm, 
2017, as commentary on Kujala, 2017, 2018) and we propose that investigating 
whether ‘animals show empathy’ within the framework of a human definition is 
too restricted. This stance is well in line with a recent opinion article, proposing 
that holding the investigation of (animal) empathy up to the strict criteria of a 
(human) definition limits the findings in animal research, which then again 
“might not be constructive when investigating the evolution of empathy from 
comparative viewpoints.” (Yamamoto, 2017, p. 2). While some scholars argue 
that research has already provided sufficient evidence for animal empathy (e.g. 
Sivaselvachandran et al., 2018), we propose based on our review that this is not 
the case, or at least not sufficiently so to exclude alternative hypotheses, and that 
we should seek to re-orient our perspective of investigating empathy to a more 
systematic comparative approach. 
Box 1: Batson’s eight empathy-related phenomena, or “These things called empathy” (Batson, 2009, p. 3). 
















Daniel Batson, a social psychologist who has devoted most of his career to empathy research, describes eight empathy-related concepts or phenomena based on a 
broad multidisciplinary review of the literature. Importantly, he considers these related concepts not as components or elements of empathy, but phenomena that 
are stand-alone and psychologically distinct. The phenomena are therefore different psychological states one may experience in social interactions with another 
(e.g. such as when talking to a friend who went through a negative experience), and these different states correspond to the eight empathy-related phenomena. 
Notably, in the literature reviewed, each of these phenomena is often referred to as being “empathy itself”, adding to the confusion to what empathy “really is”. 
Though, according to Batson, these phenomena are conceptually distinct, and although they are related to empathy, they should be labelled by their own conceptual 
name. 
Concept 1: “Knowing Another Person’s Internal State, Including His or Her Thoughts and Feelings” (Batson, 2009, p. 4). Concept 1 is the general knowledge 
about somebody’s internal state. This concept has also been labelled empathy (e.g. Preston and de Waal, 2002) or cognitive empathy (e.g. Zahn-Waxler et al., 
1992a, 1992b). 
Concept 2: “Adopting the Posture or Matching the Neural Responses of an Observed Other” (Batson, 2009, p. 4). Concept 2 refers to mimicking the posture 
or expression of the other, and is also generally labelled as motor mimicry (e.g. Hoffman, 2000) or imitation. Batson argues that this concept may contribute to 
eventually understanding the other’s feelings and thoughts, yet, he also argues that neither neural response matching (such as seen in the PAM, Preston and de 
Waal, 2002) or motor mimicry are sufficient sources or cues for empathic feelings for the other. 
Concept 3: “Coming to Feel as Another Person Feels” (Batson, 2009, p. 5). Concept 3 is feeling as the other, though Batson mentions that it is not clear from 
research whether these feelings should be exactly the same emotion or could be a similar emotion. This concept is often also commonly referred to as emotional 
contagion, in which both emotional matching and catching are important (Hatfield et al., 1994). Emotional matching means that two subjects experience the same 
emotional state, which is in contrast to for example physiological matching, in which two subjects show a similar physiological profile, yet, this profile or arousal 
might be associated with different emotions (see also our discussion in Chapter 2.2.2.). Emotional catching refers to the source from where the emotional state is 
‘caught’, which can be either from observing the other subject’s state (i.e. emotional contagion), or can originate from the shared situation (i.e. the source which 
originally changed the other subject’s state) (see also our discussion in Chapter 2.2.2.1.). 
Aside from emotional contagion, this concept has in the contemporary literature also been labelled affective empathy (e.g. Zahn-Waxler et al., 1992a, 1992b), 
and automatic emotional empathy (e.g. Hodges and Wegner, 1997). 
Concept 4: “Intuiting or Projecting Oneself into Another’s Situation” (Batson, 2009, p. 6). Concept 4 relates to for example the process a writer or painter goes 
through when depicting a character or object, and was described by Lipps (1903) as “Einfühlung” (“feeling into”), and named empathy (Titchener, 1909). Batson 
refers to this definition of empathy as an “aesthetic projection” (p. 6), yet, this definition is in contrast to the contemporary descriptions in the scientific literature 
of empathy. 
Concept 5: “Imagining How Another Is Thinking and Feeling” (Batson, 2009, p. 7). Concept 5 entails that you imagine how the other feels and thinks (based 
on how they act, what they say, and your knowledge of the situation). This concept is also labelled perspective taking (Ruby and Decety, 2004), psychological 
empathy (in contrast to aesthetic empathy from Concept 4, Wispé, 1968), and empathy or projection (Adolphs, 1999). 
Concept 6: “Imagining How One Would Think and Feel in the Other’s Place” (Batson, 2009, p. 7). Concept 6 refers to how you would feel and think if you 
were the other, and so, the focus is here on the self, whereas in Concept 5 the focus is on the other. This concept is also called cognitive empathy (Povinelli, 1993), 
projective empathy (Darwall, 1998), and perspective taking (Piaget, 1953). 
Concept 7: “Feeling Distress at Witnessing Another Person’s Suffering” (Batson, 2009, p. 7). Concept 7 refers to feeling distress by seeing the other in distress, 
which is in contrast to feeling distress for the other (Concept 8) and feeling distress as the other (Concept 3). This concept is also named personal distress (Batson, 
1991), empathic distress (Hoffman, 2000), or empathy (Krebs, 1975). 
Concept 8: “Feeling for Another Person Who Is Suffering” (Batson, 2009, p. 8). Concept 8 is an other-oriented emotional response, implying that the emotion 
is felt for the other. This emotional response for the other is elicited by perceiving the state of the other, in which both the other-oriented emotional response and 
other’s state are congruent in their valence (a negative state in the other elicits a negative response, and vice versa for positive state). This means that you may feel 
negatively for the other when they feel sad, but you don’t need to feel exactly the same emotional state (such as in Concept 3). This concept is also labeled empathic 
concern (Batson, 1991), sympathetic distress (Hoffman, 2000), or sympathy (Darwall, 1998; Preston and de Waal, 2002; Wispé, 1986). 
Batson discusses that each of the eight phenomena (may) serve as answer to either one or both of empathy’s important research questions, “How do we 
understand others’ feelings?” and “How does that knowledge lead to actions of care for the other?”. Question 1 relates to Concept 1 and Concepts 2–6 have been 
proposed as potential answers to this question. Batson argues that Concept 7 and 8 do not provide insight into another’s state, but they are reactions to that insight 
or state. Additionally, some have argued that Concepts 1–7 may serve as antecedents of Concept 8. Furthermore, Batson discusses that the second question taps 
into empathy for the other, such as feelings of sympathy, which may eventually motivate to act and relieve another’s suffering. Therefore, question 2 may be 
answered by Concepts 7 and 8, with Concept 7 involving a motivation coming from self-concern, and Concept 8 entailing motivation based on other-oriented 
concern. See Batson (2009) for further extensive discussion of the empathy-related concepts. 
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In a recent review paper, Cuff et al. (2016) uncovered 43 distinct definitions of empathy in human research. The major distinctions between these definitions 
can be summarized in eight themes. 
• The 1sttheme concerns the distinction between empathy and its related concepts. Some view empathy as the overarching category (e.g. Preston and de 
Waal, 2002) while others argue for a more distinct approach (e.g. Batson, 2009, see also Box 1). For instance, in particular concerning sympathy, some 
have argued that this concept should not be merged with empathy (as agreed upon by e.g. Decety and Michalska, 2010; Eisenberg et al., 1991; Hein and 
Singer, 2008; Singer and Lamm, 2009; but see for other viewpoints e.g. Davis, 1996; Hoffman, 2000). 
• The 2ndtheme entails the question whether empathy is cognitive or affective, which refers to either understanding another’s feelings versus experiencing 
another’s feelings, and some definitions argue to include both as cognition and affect can occur in interaction (e.g. Lamm et al., 2007). 
• The 3rdtheme concerns the difference between experiencing congruent or incongruent emotional states with the other. Congruent experiences between 
observer and target are also referred to as shared or vicarious experiences, and some consider such emotional congruency as necessary in order to be related 
to empathy (e.g. Decety and Lamm, 2009; Hein and Singer, 2008; Lamm et al., 2019), though others disagree, or even argue that measuring exact emotional 
matching is almost impossible (Preston, 2007). In line with the 1st theme, it has been argued that emotional congruency is essential to separate empathy 
from sympathy, in which the latter relates to one’s own feelings for the other, and may therefore be incongruent with the other’s state (Hein and Singer, 
2008). 
• The 4ththeme relates to empathy needing a direct perception of (the emotional state of) the other versus other stimuli being sufficient to lead to empathy 
(e.g. Blair, 2005). Such is the case when the target does not show emotional cues but the observer infers the emotional state through imagination or 
perspective taking, or for instance when dealing with a fictional character (Singer and Lamm, 2009). 
• The 5ththeme concerns whether empathy involves self-other distinction (e.g. De Vignemont and Singer, 2006) or involves a merging with the other, and 
others add that a merging with the other is important to eventually understand the other (e.g. Decety and Sommerville, 2003). Self-other distinction has 
also been argued to be important to differentiate empathy from other concepts such as emotional contagion (Decety and Lamm, 2009; Lamm et al., 2016). 
• The 6ththeme entails whether empathy is a trait (i.e. ability, capacity) or a state (and thus, context dependent). Here some argue that individuals can be 
more empathic than others with empathy being stable over time (e.g. Oliveira-Silva and Gonçalves, 2011), though situational factors may also influence 
empathy such as similarity between observer and target. 
• The 7ththeme relates to empathy having a behavioural outcome or not, in which it is argued that sometimes empathy is followed with a response, though 
not always (e.g. de Vignemont & Singer, 2006; Eisenberg et al., 1994), or even never in an immediate manner. Some scholars say that empathy only has a 
behavioural response when it is mediated through sympathy (e.g. De Vignemont and Singer, 2006 ; Eisenberg et al., 1994, but see for other viewpoint e.g. 
Oliveira-Silva and Gonçalves, 2011). 
• The 8ththeme refers to empathy being automatic or under control. While initial neuroscience research seemed to suggest that empathy may be automatically 
elicited upon perceiving the emotional state of the other (Singer et al., 2004; though this study did not directly study automaticity), later and more systematic 
work has questioned this assumption (Gu and Han, 2007), and it is now widely accepted that empathy may be controlled, modified, reframed, or suppressed 
by cognitive processing or other factors (Hodges and Biswas-Diener, 2007; Hein and Singer, 2008) 
Based on these eight themes Cuff and colleagues have proposed an updated definition of empathy, namely “Empathy is an emotional response (affective), 
dependent upon the interaction between trait capacities and state influences. Empathic processes are automatically elicited but are also shaped by top-down 
control processes. The resulting emotion is similar to one’s perception (directly experienced or imagined) and understanding (cognitive empathy) of the 
stimulus emotion, with recognition that the source of the emotion is not one’s own.” 
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1.2. Comparing empathy across species 
Research on animal empathy has generally embraced the investigation of 
different empathy-related phenomena (of which some appear in the overview by 
Batson, 2009, see Box 1). In a highly influential paper setting the stage for the 
comparative study of empathy, Preston and de Waal proposed the Russian doll 
model which organizes these phenomena in a unified design (Preston and de 
Waal, 2002; de Waal and Preston, 2017). At the model’s foundation is the 
Perception Action model (PAM), which has been proposed as the main 
mechanism of empathy in both humans and animals. This mechanism is 
described as the “Spontaneous activation of an individual’s own personal 
representations for a target, their state and their situation when perceiving the 
target’s state” (de Waal and Preston, 2017, p. 4). In other words, the perception 
of the other leads to matching neural responses, which in turn leads to either an 
experiencing or understanding of the other’s emotional state. Mirror neurons 
have been proposed to serve as neurobiological evidence for the PAM (Gallese 
et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1996; de Waal and Preston, 2017; but see Rizzolatti 
and Caruana, 2017). These neurons engage both when seeing an action and when 
performing that action oneself, and recent suggestions propose a similar 
mechanism for perceiving and feeling an emotion as well (e.g. Carr et al., 2003). 
Yet, to date there is no overall consensus on mirror neuron function and a 
potential role in understanding emotions or empathy (Decety, 2010; Baird et al., 
2011), and disagreement exists about whether mirror neuron activation only 
reflects, in the sense of correlation, or indeed suggests understanding of an action 
(e.g. Molenberghs et al., 2009; Hickok, 2009). Consequently, whether mirror 
neurons are causally related to our empathic responses remains a matter of 
debate (see Lamm and Majdandžić, 2015, for review; Bekkali et al., 2019). 
With the PAM at its foundation, the Russian doll model comprises different 
evolutionary layers of empathy, which contain gradually more complex 
concepts that are built upon each other and which are functionally connected 
with each surrounding layer (see Fig. 1). At the basic layer and its perception-
action mechanism are the resulting phenomena of emotional contagion and 
motor mimicry. These concepts are the inner core that forms the foundation of 
all other, higher-placed concepts. From that base onwards, the sequential and 
vertically aligned layers are related to increasing development of cognitive 
complexity, emotional regulation, and self-other distinction. The latter plays an 
important role in differentiating the basic layers from the upper layers, often 
referred to as self- versus other-oriented concern (de Waal, 2008). The 
remaining surrounding layers represent other empathic phenomena such as 
sympathetic concern and consolation, and perspective taking and targeted 
helping. In the Russian doll model, empathy is considered an umbrella term for 
all the phenomena and is defined as the “emotional and mental sensitivity to 
another’s state, from being affected by and sharing in this state to assessing the 
reasons for it and adopting the other’s point of view” (de Waal and Preston, 2017, 
p. 1). 
The doll model has greatly motivated the investigation of animal empathy 
and inspired many scholars to embrace the notion of animals experiencing (self- 
and other-focused) emotions. Yet, its proposed structure inherently generates 
some limitations, which we believe deserve attention when using the model as a 
theoretical framework of animal empathy. The main restriction concerns the 
linear composition, which proposes a contingency between the model’s layers 
(and thus, its phenomena). By claiming linearity and contingency, the model 
assumes that certain phenomena serve as prerequisite for other concepts (Hollis 
and Nowbahari, 2013; Yamamoto, 2017). This contradicts several findings in 
the literature, such as, e.g., evidence for helping without (evidence of) 
perspective taking (in tufted capuchin monkeys, Cebus apella, as discussed in 
Yamamoto, 2017; in laboratory rats, Rattus norvegicus, Bartal et al., 2011; in 
ants, Cataglyphis cursor, Hollis and Nowbahari, 2013), or perspective taking 
without helping (e.g. in chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, Yamamoto et al., 2009; 
see Yamamoto, 2017, for a discussion on the difference between helping through 




Fig. 1. Russian doll model of empathy 
At the doll model’s foundation is the perception-action mechanism, which leads to a similar 
emotional state in observer and target. From this mechanism result the two concepts motor 
mimicry and emotional contagion. The next concepts sympathetic concern and consolation 
are built further upon this core, and so are perspective taking and targeted helping. (Adapted 
by permission from Springer Nature Customer Service Centre GmbH: Springer Nature, 
Nature Reviews Neuroscience, Mammalian empathy: Behavioural manifestations and 
neural basis, de Waal and Preston, Copyright 2017). 
 
 
In addition, the assumption of linearity also implies a dependency between 
the inner and the outer cores – therefore assuming that consolation, perspective 
taking, and helping, must contain elements of emotion sharing (at least in the 
context of an empathy based framework) (de Waal, 2008). Emotional contagion, 
for instance, is regularly labelled as a basic building block of empathy (e.g. 
Palagi et al., 2015). Yet, emotional contagion is often not empirically confirmed 
or even assessed when studying ‘higher up’ concepts such as consolation or 
targeted helping (see Chapter 3, for more detailed discussion). Moreover, 
rigorous empirical evidence for emotional contagion is still lacking in a great 
number of species (Edgar et al., 2012, for review, and see Chapter 2), which is 
in contrast to some scholars arguing otherwise (e.g. Sümegi et al., 2014; de Waal 
and Preston, 2017). 
Though the Russian doll model has received acclaim for its elegant 
simplicity (e.g. Sivaselvachandran et al., 2018), this simplicity may not 
sufficiently reflect empathy’s complexity (Hollis and Nowbahari, 2013; 
Yamamoto, 2017). Its broad approach in which every concept flows into the 
other and in which any higher up concepts encompass all the lower ones, may 
furthermore hinder an exhaustive grasping of each individual concept (Coplan, 
2011). We argue that all phenomena related to empathy are equally relevant for 
our understanding of animal empathy. By systematically disentangling each of 
them, their definition (s), underlying mechanism(s), and potential interactions 
with other concepts, we hope to reduce confusion and facilitate the interpretation 
and comparison of results (see also Cuff et al., 2016; but see also de Waal and 
Preston, 2017, for an argument against such a “dissected” approach as, “There 
exists a tendency to treat each aspect separately and dwell on the distinctions, 
but in doing so we lose sight of the functionally integrated whole”, p. 1). A 
similar argument has also been made in the human empathy field, such as that 
confusion may be reduced by acknowledging empathy’s complexity, and that 
“The best one can do is recognize the different phenomena, make clear the 
labelling scheme one is adopting, and use that scheme consistently” (Batson, 
2009, p. 8). 
As an alternative to the Russian doll model, Yamamoto suggested a 
combination model of empathy (2017) which allows for the study of the 
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independent emergence of each phenomenon, as well as its interactions (see Fig. 
2). In particular, the combination model consists of three organizing factors of 
empathy: matching with others (e.g. emotional contagion), understanding of 
others (e.g. perspective taking), and prosociality (e.g. food sharing). The three 
factors, also labelled components or mechanisms of empathy (Yamamoto, 
2017), can exist independently on their own, or with potential combinations 
between them. Unlike the Russian doll model, they do not require a sequential 
dependence on each other. For example, the combination model suggests that 
phenomena under ‘prosociality’ do not necessarily require an emotional 
matching. In addition, the concepts in the combination model are not linked to 
an increase in cognitive complexity (with the exception of the centre concepts, 
see Chapter 3.2.3.). This decoupling may motivate researchers to investigate a 
concept in a given species due to the concept being relevant for the species’ 
ecology, rather than due to a general idea of more or less cognitive capacity 
(Hollis and Nowbahari, 2013). Overall, the combination model allows to focus 
on each phenomenon, how it (mechanistically) works, why it is (functionally) 
relevant to the studied species, and how it interacts with other phenomena 
(Coplan, 2011). By focusing on the phenomena first in an independent fashion, 




Fig. 2. Combination model of empathy 
The combination model is divided into three organizing factors of empathy, namely 
Matching with others, Understanding of others, and Prosociality. Each factor contains a set 
of phenomena. Matching with others includes synchrony, mimicry, emotional contagion; 
Understanding of others includes perspective taking, Machiavellian intelligence, 
Schadenfreude; Prosociality includes food sharing, prosocial choice. The combination 
section (1) includes Cognitive contagion, Envy or disadvantageous inequity aversion; (2) 
includes Pre-concern, Chameleon effect, Collaboration; (3) includes Sympathy or 
consolation, Calculated reciprocity, Advantageous inequity aversion; (4) includes Targeted 
helping. (Adapted by permission from John Wiley and Sons: Wiley Interdisciplinary 
Reviews: Cognitive Science, Primate empathy: three factors and their combinations for 
empathy‐related phenomena, Yamamoto, Copyright 2017). 
 
This initial review of the use of the term empathy and of two prominent, yet, 
rather distinct models of animal empathy make us propose that as long as there 
is disagreement on what empathy “really” is, the field should probably refrain 
from using observations of related concepts as evidence for empathy (e.g. 
Batson, 2009). Interestingly, the challenges outlined for the comparative 
investigation of empathy resemble those faced for other complex cognitive 
abilities, such as the evolution of language. Instead of favouring a specific factor 
of language (e.g. speech), and consequently a devaluation of the other 
components (e.g. syntax), Fitch (2017) advocates for acknowledging the 
complexity of language and its multi-componential nature in order to progress 
comparative research. Similarly, the combination model (Yamamoto, 2017) 
argues for a multi-component approach to recognize empathy’s complexity. As 
such, despite the confusing terminological and empirical history of animal (and 
human) empathy, many researchers will agree that empathy is a complex 
construct composed of a multiplicity of distinct concepts, overlapping 
components and different mechanisms within these. We are convinced that this 
complexity needs to be acknowledged more systematically, both in theoretical 
and empirical work. 
In conclusion of this first section of our review, we would like to emphasize 
that a human driven definition of empathy has a set of strict (yet, debated) 
requirements for a behaviour to be considered empathy. Therefore, comparing 
animal research against this human reference may inhibit the progress of animal 
empathy research. In addition, the established Russian doll model of empathy 
(Preston and de Waal, 2002) may, due to its linear structure, confine the complex 
nature of empathy. For this reason, the combination model has been proposed as 
alternative (Yamamoto, 2017), which prompts to investigate the distinct 
empathy-related phenomena independently. In our discussion of the three 
phenomena emotional contagion, consolation, and targeted helping, we now 
review the feasibility of the two frameworks, and how they guide the 
interpretation of empirical evidence. 
2. Emotional contagion 
2.1. Definitions and terminology 
In the human literature, emotional contagion was originally defined by 
Hatfield et al. (1994) as “The tendency to automatically mimic and synchronize 
facial expressions, vocalizations, postures, and movements with those of another 
person's and, consequently, to converge emotionally” (pp. 153–154). Together 
with the PAM (see Chapter 1.2.), human research has proposed mimicry as a 
potential mechanism for emotional contagion (Hatfield et al., 1994). This 
hypothesis suggests that upon mimicking another’s facial expression or body 
posture, the mimicker receives emotional feedback from those expressions, 
consequently leading to a convergence with the other’s emotional state. Yet, 
current evidence in human research does not fully support the mimicry 
hypothesis (see e.g. Hess and Blairy, 2001, and see Chapter 2.2.1. below), and 
which other mechanisms underlie emotional contagion is still undetermined (an 
overview of the different proposed mechanisms is outside the scope of this 
review but see e.g. Deng and Hu, 2018; IsernMas and Gomila, 2019, for an 
extensive discussion of the mimicry hypothesis). Earlier work on animal 
behaviour may have hinted at emotional contagion between animals, although 
without necessarily labelling it so (e.g. rats refrain from pressing a lever to avoid 
conspecifics receiving an electric shock, Church, 1959; rats relieve a suspending 
rat in the air, Rice and Gainer, 1962; rhesus monkeys avoid pulling a chain which 
delivers an electric shock to their conspecific, Masserman et al., 1964; rats alarm 
the rest of their colony by means of “Stimmungsübertragung” (translated as 
“mood transmission”), Lorenz, 1966). The term ‘emotional contagion’ was 
eventually brought into the animal research limelight by de Waal’s pioneering 
work on animal empathy (e.g. 2002; 2008; see Chapter 1.2. and Fig. 1 in our 
paper). He defines emotional contagion as “an emotional state-matching of a 
subject with an object” (2008, p. 282; see also Table 1). Importantly, emotional 
contagion does not differentiate between the emotional state of the self and the 
other, as the subject takes on the other’s emotional state as if it were its own 
state. In addition, the concept does not require or address whether, or how, this 
relates to concern for the other (Singer and Lamm, 2009). We now review two 
key issues that we believe require more consideration in current emotional 
contagion research, and make suggestions for future investigations. 
2.2. Measuring emotional contagion 
2.2.1. Mimicry does not equal emotional contagion 
In its original definition by Hatfield et al. (1994), mimicry is incorporated in 
the definition of emotional contagion, with the suggestion that mimicry 
mechanistically underpins emotional contagion. The mimicry hypothesis as 
underlying driver has been embraced by many in both the human and animal 
research world (e.g. Preston and de Waal, 2002; McIntosh, 2006; Palagi et al., 
2015). Yet, the first arising problem is that the exact relation between mimicry 
and emotional contagion remains a matter of debate (Isern-Mas and Gomila, 
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2019). In the human literature there is an ongoing examination of this relation 
and its potential causal direction (Hess and Fischer, 2014; Prochazkova and 
Kret, 2017), showing that research on this topic often involves other concepts 
such as emotion recognition (Olszanowski et al., 2019), and until recently the 
majority of human studies failed to demonstrate a direct and strict link between 
mimicking facial expressions and experiencing those feelings subsequently (e.g. 
Hess and Blairy, 2001; Van Der Schalk et al., 2011; but see Olszanowski et al., 
2019, for recent evidence of mimicry as potential mediator). Moreover, though 
they often occur simultaneously, emotional contagion has been shown to occur 
without co-occurrence of mimicry (e.g., Isern-Mas and Gomila, 2019), and 
mimicry (e.g. body posture) may occur as a means to, for example, establish 
affiliative bonds, without the immediate need for, or consequence of, emotional 
contagion (Chartrand and Bargh, 1999; Lakin and Chartrand, 2003a; though 
note that it seems plausible that affiliative bonding, due to mimicry, may be 
enhanced through an affective mechanism such as emotional contagion (Lakin 
et al., 2003b)). Due to the question of their putative connection, some scholars 
have argued for the theoretical and empirical separation of emotional contagion 
and mimicry (Hess and Fischer, 2014; Nakahashi and Ohtsuki, 2015). In this 
context, it seems important to note that conceptually, mimicry and emotional 
contagion have indeed been regarded as distinct terms by many scholars (see 
also Table 1). Emotional contagion, on the one hand, is the copying of another’s 
emotional state (Nakahashi and Ohtsuki, 2015) or, put in human-oriented terms, 
“the matching of a subjective emotional experience” (Hess and Fischer, 2014, p. 
47). Mimicry, on the other hand, is the copying of another’s appearance and 
motor display, such as facial expressions (Nakahashi and Ohtsuki, 2015), and 
mostly concerns “the matching of nonverbal displays” (Hess and Fischer, 2014, 
p. 47) without necessarily implying emotion matching. 
This conceptual difference and the debated validation of the mimicry 
hypothesis are relevant to our review, as they highlight the second problem, 
namely, that emotional contagion in animals is often inferred from the presence 
of mimicry. In other words, the (putative, though not sufficiently confirmed) 
mechanism of a phenomenon is taken as evidence for the phenomenon itself. 
Moreover, emotional contagion necessarily includes an emotional experience, 
which is not included in the definition of mimicry. Consequently, for some 
phenomenon to be labelled as emotional contagion, one needs to provide 
evidence for an emotional response (Isern-Mas and Gomila, 2019; but see 
Lahvis, 2016, who argues for a behavioural basis), rather than providing 
evidence for one putative mechanism leading to, or is correlated with, such a 
response. Yet, a large part of the published work on emotional contagion in 
animals shows a blurring of the two concepts, which is why the observation of 
overt mimicry is often interpreted as evidence for the presence of emotional 
contagion. For instance, studies on rapid facial mimicry during play (e.g. in 
orangutans, Pongo pygmaeus, Davila-Ross et al., 2007; in dogs, Palagi et al., 
2015; in meerkats, Suricata suricatta, Palagi et al., 2019a, 2019b), or contagious 
yawning (e.g. in dogs, Joly-Mascheroni et al., 2008, but see e.g. Harr et al., 2009, 
for no evidence of contagious yawning in dogs) have argued to provide evidence 
for emotional contagion. Nonetheless, as also discussed in human research (e.g. 
Hess and Fischer, 2014), the presence of congruent motor action does not 
automatically imply congruent emotional states (e.g. O’Hara and Reeve, 2011, 
who show no evidence of a connection between emotional contagion and 
contagious yawning in dogs), and congruent emotional states have been 
observed without congruent motor action (e.g. in dogs, who show a matching of 
distress with their owners, Sümegi et al., 2014; in ravens, Corvus corax, who 
show affect matching with a conspecific, Adriaense et al., 2019a). Regarding 
facial expressions, it is important to point out the variation in intentionality of 
facial expression production, and its interaction with context and affect. Human 
facial expressions and mimicry may be under more volitional control than 
expressions demonstrated by animals. For instance, it is assumed that playface 
in animals occurs as a spontaneous expression and for that reason its relation to 
underlying affect may be more reliable. Although in the mentioned human 
research participants were not explicitly asked to mimic facial expressions, and 
the research goal was masked by a cover story (e.g. Hess and Blairy, 2001), the 
notion of intentional production of facial mimicry remains an important concept 
to consider when comparing human and animal research literature. 
Based on our discussion of the distinction between mimicry and emotional 
contagion, we cannot conclude with confidence that all animals that exhibit some 
form of mimicry are also susceptible to emotional contagion, and even less so 
that their mimicry responses are evidence for emotional contagion. However, 
we find little mention of this distinction in the animal research literature (but see 
e.g. Edgar and Nicol, 2018; Nakahashi and Ohtsuki, 2015; and Isern-Mas and 
Gomila, 2019). Therefore, in the next chapters, we attend to yawn and play 
contagion in more detail. In regards to the theoretical frameworks, emotional 
contagion in the Russian doll model (Preston and de Waal, 2002) assumes to be 
tightly linked to motor mimicry. In contrast, in the combination model 
(Yamamoto, 2017), this link is not necessarily a prerequisite for either concept. 
According to our discussion of the mimicry hypothesis of emotional contagion, 
it seems commendable for future research to carefully interpret collected 
empirical data in light of both models, and to compare them accordingly. 
2.2.1.1. Yawn contagion. Contagious yawning has been taken as indicative of 
empathy, or at the very least as evidence for emotional contagion (e.g. Palagi et 
al., 2014a, 2014b; Norscia and Palagi, 2011; Clay et al., 2018). In a broad sense, 
yawn contagion is considered as a form of mimicry (Yoon and Tennie, 2010; 
see Table 1 for definitions of mimicry and behavioural contagion). Therefore, 
the notion of linking yawn contagion to emotional contagion partially developed 
from the rationale that mimicry is, to some degree, linked to emotional contagion 
(see Chapter 2.2.1). Yet, as discussed, the (causal) relation between mimicry and 
emotional contagion remains debated. Hence, this limitation also extends to the 
domain of yawn contagion, and the conclusion of yawn contagion as an indicator 
of emotional contagion, or empathy (broadly defined), seems premature on 
several accounts (see also Massen and Gallup, 2017, for a review). First, the 
connection between yawn contagion and empathy is often based on observations 
of a familiarity bias (i.e. increased response toward familiar vs. unfamiliar 
conspecifics). Though this bias indeed exists in humans (Palagi et al., 2014a), as 
well as for example in primates (Campbell and de Waal, 2011; Demuru and 
Palagi, 2012) and in dogs (Silva et al., 2012), this bias could be caused by 
increased attention to familiar individuals, rather than by a higher propensity to 
mimic their behaviour (e.g. Yoon and Tennie, 2010; see for further discussion 
on familiarity bias Chapter 3.2.1.). Second, developmental research in humans 
is not congruent with a simple, mechanistic connection between emotional 
contagion and yawn contagion. For instance, infants are susceptible to 
surrounding emotions from the moment they are born, and self-regulatory skills 
start to control the contagion during the first year of life (Hay et al., 1981; 
Hatfield et al., 1994; Davidov et al., 2013). If yawn contagion were linked to the 
root mechanism of near-automatic mimicry of movements and emotions, it 
should also appear very early in development and show a decline in frequency 
and/or susceptibility to the yawn stimulus as self-regulation of emotional states 
improves. However, children begin to show contagious yawning only at the age 
of four to five years, after the stages of unregulated mimicry and emotional 
contagion have passed, and during the development of more cognitively oriented 
processes of empathy (Millen and Anderson, 2010; note that the parallel 
development does not necessarily imply an explicit connection, Massen and 
Gallup, 2017). Third, emotional contagion necessarily includes an emotional 
experience, which is questionable in regards of yawning. It remains unclear 
which emotional state would be present, and transferred, during yawn contagion, 
and the literature does not present a consistent hypothesis on such a state 
(Massen and Gallup, 2017). For example, researchers have suggested that 
yawning is a sign of boredom (Lehmann, 1979; Toohey, 2011, as discussed in 
Burn, 2017) and thus, following this statement, yawn contagion should reflect 
the transfer of boredom. To test this hypothesis, (behavioural and physiological) 
parameters should be assessed, such as disrupted sleep and abnormal behaviour, 
and then combined to establish a potential boredom state (see Burn, 2017, for a 
review on boredom). To our knowledge, these particular parameters have not 
been reported in the literature, and for this reason, the collection of (long-term) 
behavioural data of other expressions together with observations of yawn 
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contagion could be interesting to further investigate the boredom hypothesis. 
Others have claimed a connection between contagious yawning and (mild) 
stress. For instance, when stump-tailed macaques (Macaca arctoides) observe 
conspecifics yawning, the subjects demonstrate contagious yawning and self-
scratching (which is often observed in a stress context) (Paukner and Anderson, 
2005). Several studies in dogs have aimed at testing the stress hypothesis, but 
their results are ambiguous. In one study, dogs who performed contagious 
yawning had no increase in heart rate (Romero et al., 2013), but another study 
showed that dogs who yawn in response to human yawns have elevated cortisol 
levels (though only on the individual level of 12 out of 60 subjects) (Buttner and 
Strasser, 2014). Interestingly, a recent study did not find contagious yawning in 
dogs, but did demonstrate that oxytocin administration decreases yawning (Kiss 
et al., 2019). Based on the hypothesis of oxytocin having a stress relieving effect, 
the authors propose that contagious yawning is a social stress response and 
suggest that there is no relation with an empathy related concept. Similarly, in 
lowland gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla), researchers found no observations of 
yawn contagion but did report an increase in self-directed behaviour, which in 
turn may be stress related (Palagi et al., 2019a, 2019b). In contrast to hypotheses 
of negative states, some argue that yawning might relate to a relaxed state, or at 
least might serve to signal the absence of danger, which is assumed to reduce 
tension in a group (e.g. in the South African ostrich, Struthio camelus australis, 
Sauer and Sauer, 1967). A relaxed state is defined as a positive state (Mendl et 
al., 2010), and, thus, researchers should aim at assessing additional, positive 
related parameters to test this hypothesis. Finally, contrary to claims of 
emotional contagion, others have suggested that yawn contagion may be arousal 
related (e.g. contagious yawning and stretching in budgerigars, Miller et al., 
2012), and some scholars argue that yawn contagion (merely) reflects an 
example of behavioural contagion (Yoon and Tennie, 2010; see Table 1). In the 
latter case, yawning and its contagious expression are an indicator of a neutral 
state and, therefore, contagious yawning might not reflect any emotional state 
(see also Guggisberg et al., 2010; Massen and Gallup, 2017; for extensive 
reviews of contagious yawning). 
In conclusion, at present, yawn contagion does not provide clear and 
convincing evidence of emotional contagion, and even less so of empathy, 
irrespective of its specific definition. We argue that to further validate claims 
such as “yawn contagion is a form of emotional contagion” (Palagi et al., 2014a, 
2014b, p. 2), research should continue to focus on assessing additional 
parameters and emotional states during events of yawn contagion, 
systematically record the social context in which contagion occurs, and add 
observations of long-term behavioural data. If yawn contagion is indeed related 
to the transfer of either a negative or positive state, then it is important to 
measure negative or positive related parameters, respectively, such as avoidance 
or approach behaviour, and physiological changes. In addition, it remains 
important to specify which empathic phenomena could be related to, or 
facilitated by, contagious yawning. Recent research in humans shows that 
subjects who score higher on an implicit test of empathy (i.e. the Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index) also demonstrate higher frequency of contagious yawning 
(Franzen et al., 2018). This is an interesting addition to the current literature, 
still, in light of our previous discussion on empathy defined from a human 
perspective (Chapter 1), and in order to benefit comparative research, studies 
should aim to disentangle the different empathy-related phenomena in the study 
of yawn contagion. 
2.2.1.2. Play contagion. Play behaviour has been observed in a large range of 
species (Burghardt, 1998) and there is ample evidence of play behaviour having 
both short- and long-term beneficial consequences for motor, brain, and 
behavioural development (see Held and Špinka, 2011, for an extensive review). 
For that reason, play has been proposed to facilitate group life by reducing 
aggression and increasing social harmony (see e.g. Sharpe and Cherry, 2003). 
Still, this hypothesis remains unconfirmed and research shows contrasting 
results. For instance, social play in meerkats does not reduce aggressive 
interactions (Sharpe and Cherry, 2003) or improve social cohesion (Sharpe, 
2005), though, it does improve social cohesion in dogs (Sommerville et al., 
2017), and improves future social bonding in juvenile macaques (Macaca 
fuscata, Shimada and Sueur, 2018). Under the assumption that play has positive 
effects on social relations, researchers have proposed a connection between the 
spread of play (i.e. play contagion), and the presence of positive emotional 
contagion. Upon seeing a conspecific perform object play (e.g. in common 
ravens, Osvath and Sima, 2014), and upon hearing a playback of a conspecific’s 
play-call (e.g. in kea, Nestor notabilis, Schwing et al., 2017), the respective 
observing animals began performing play behaviour themselves (see also 
Briefer, 2018, for a review of vocal contagion, including laughter contagion). In 
both studies, the authors suggest this to be evidence for positive emotional 
contagion. Yet, this conclusion seems insufficiently substantiated. In a similar 
vein as in our previous discussion of mimicry, it is important to consider that the 
occurrence of similar behaviours between animals does not necessarily allow 
researchers to infer the presence of the same (or any) contagiously transferred 
emotional state (Briefer, 2018). For this inference, researchers would need to 
show whether observed play behaviour remains on the level of (motor) mimicry, 
or whether it is also accompanied by a matching affective state. Furthermore, if 
emotional responding does occur, the question remains which emotion that 
would be, and whether play always and indisputably carries a matching 
(presumably positive) state. If it is assumed that play behaviour correlates with 
a positively valenced state, studies should expect to find a variety of positive 
behavioural expressions (Briefer, 2018) - but such indicators were not reported 
in either study (Osvath and Sima, 2014; Schwing et al., 2017). In fact, a recent 
review shows that a direct scientific investigation of the relationship between 
positive affect and play is still missing (Ahloy-Dallaire et al., 2018). 
Additionally, a review on the function of play (in dogs) shows that social 
play appears in a range of different positive and negative contexts, that play is 
modulated by different factors such as early-life experience and the context of 
interaction, and that play may serve different functions such as motor skill 
development and social cohesion (see Sommerville et al., 2017, for a review of 
different theories). However, the beneficial outcome of play, such as social 
cohesion, does not necessarily imply that play itself is positive in the moment it 
occurs. Research shows that adult male chimpanzees use social play as a means 
to reduce social tension in all-male groups, which confirms the positive outcome 
of play (Yamanashi et al., 2018). Yet, play bouts tend to be increased before 
feeding (which is often perceived as stress inducing due to the anticipation of 
food, see also Palagi et al., 2009, for bonobo play before feeding), and though 
social grooming (which is known to reduce anxiety, see e.g. Russell and Phelps, 
2013) correlates negatively with aggressive encounters, play behaviour shows 
no correlation with aggression. Moreover, social grooming and social play are 
negatively correlated in these chimpanzee groups. This conclusion does not 
diminish the positive outcome of play on social group life, yet, it does put the 
interpretation of play as a global indicator of positive emotional state, or positive 
contagion, into question. 
Taken all these factors into account, it seems more plausible that the 
emotional state during play and the social consequences of play depend greatly 
on the species and their social system, and the individual’s own experiences and 
contexts during which play occurs. Therefore, implying that contagious play is 
related to experiencing a positive emotional state, and thus interpreting social 
play as an indicator of positive emotional contagion, seems not warranted at 
present (which contrasts to what is often assumed, e.g. Palagi et al., 2019a, 
2019b). Unquestionably, the empirical demonstration of emotions in animals is 
challenging in general. Such demonstration requires a focus on both the arousal 
and valence component of an emotional state (see below), and the observation 
of synchronised changes in behaviour, physiology, and cognition (i.e. the multi-
component nature of an emotion, see Chapter 2.2.2., and Paul et al., 2020). We 
are positive about play contagion as a valuable approach to investigate emotional 
contagion in animals, under the condition that its empirical investigation is 
approached from an emotional, and thus multi-componential, perspective. 
Considering the beneficial outcomes of play and the large body of research in an 
extensive range of species, we encourage researchers to continue using play as 
a model to test novel paradigms of assessing (positive) emotions and, 
subsequently, emotional contagion. 
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2.2.2. The importance of valence and arousal 
Overall, human and animal emotion researchers agree that emotions are 
multi-componential, in which changes in behavioural, physiological, and 
cognitive components occur in a coordinated manner (see for reviews Mendl et 
al., 2010; Paul et al., 2005 on the relevance of measuring cognitive components; 
see Anderson and Adolphs, 2014, for a discussion on the multi-componential 
nature of emotions; and see Fig. 3). An additional component in humans is the 
subjective (conscious) feeling, which is currently considered unmeasurable in 
animals. Nevertheless, some scholars argue this should not restrict research on 
animal emotions (see for a discussion e.g. LeDoux, 1996; Berridge, 2018; Rolls, 
2013; Mendl et al., 2010; de Waal, 2010). Thus, the multicomponent model 
allows for a systematic study of the coordinated changes of each of the 
(measurable) components, which further permits to study animal emotions 
comparatively. Additionally, these components can be classified according to 
two dimensions of an emotional experience, namely valence (positive or 
negative) and arousal (low or high intensity) (commonly referred to as ‘core 






Fig. 3. Multi-component model of an emotion 
Changes in emotional states can be observed through changes in feelings (i.e. subjective 
experience), behaviour, physiology, and cognition. Importantly, these changes in different 
components occur in a coordinated or parallel manner. Depending on the scholar the 
direction of causality between emotional state and components differs (see Anderson and 
Adolphs, 2014, for a discussion) (Adapted from Cell, 157, Anderson and Adolphs, A 
framework for studying emotions across phylogeny, 187-200, Copyright (2014), with 
permission from Elsevier) 
Generally, notable contributions have been made to study social emotions 
through their different components, with the majority of empathy research being 
done on rodent models (e.g. see Panksepp, 1991, 2004). Regarding the 
behavioural component, studies on pain contagion show social modulation of 
pain expression in mice (Mus musculus, Langford et al., 2006; a full review on 
rodent empathy is outside the scope of this review, thus see for extensive reviews 
e.g. Keum and Shin, 2016; Sivaselvachandran et al., 2018; Meyza et al., 2017). 
In the same behavioural domain, but on fear contagion, naïve pigs (Sus scrofa) 
that are put together with experienced pigs, after the latter underwent negative 
treatment (i.e. restraint and isolation), show (negative related) behavioural 
changes 2 days and 18 days after placement with the experienced animals. 
Likewise, after observing demonstrator pigs coming from positive situations 
(i.e. enriched environment and food rewards), naïve pigs show positive 
behavioural parameters, again 2 and 18 days after observation, hinting at 
emotional contagion (Reimert et al., 2017). Some authors argue that, rather than 
observing emotional contagion, the exhibited behaviour reflects social learning 
that is potentially facilitated by emotional contagion. After being placed together 
with conspecifics coming from a fearful environment, naïve observer rats show 
an increase in exploratory behaviour and acoustic startle response, which the 
authors label as emotional arousal (Knapska et al., 2010; Meyza and Knapska, 
2018). Also in capuchin monkeys (Morimoto and Fujita, 2011) observers 
display social learning potentially mediated by an affective mechanism. Naïve 
observers will reach more and longer for an object when a demonstrator 
previously displayed positive facial expressions toward the object, and observers 
will reach less and slower for the object when the demonstrator exhibited 
negative expressions (see also Dukes and Clément, 2019, for social affective 
learning in humans). Additionally, others have suggested that a form of visual 
(emotional) contagion may occur in bystanders of an interaction. While 
observing grooming in conspecifics, Barbary macaques (Macaca sylvanus) show 
reduced anxiety themselves, are more likely to groom afterwards, and show 
increased affiliative behaviours toward others (Berthier and Semple, 2018). 
These behaviour-focused approaches greatly contribute to information on 
arousal, but some argue that they are less indicative of the valence of an emotion 
(see for reviews Paul et al., 2005; Mendl et al., 2009; Briefer, 2018). Changes in 
arousal indicate increased alertness or attention and prepare the animal for 
action, yet, such changes are not necessarily accompanied by a valenced, 
whether positive or negative, response (Edgar and Nicol, 2018). Although we 
agree that some behaviours, e.g. aggression, are likely to be consistently 
associated with negative valence, other behaviours are not as straightforward in 
their interpretation (e.g. stress grooming vs. comfort grooming, play fight vs. 
real fight). Even the assumption that seemingly straightforward behaviours such 
as aggression are correlated with either a positively or negatively valenced state 
may be limited (Paul et al., 2005; Edgar and Nicol, 2018). We greatly depend 
on the context surrounding the behaviour to determine its positive or negative 
emotional character, which consequently restricts our interpretation of the 
observable behaviour and its underlying emotion (Huber et al., 2017; Paul et al., 
2005; Mendl et al., 2009). 
Accordingly, the methodological struggle to measure animal emotions 
carries over to the measure of animal emotional contagion. When we define 
emotional contagion as emotional state-matching this demands the empirical 
demonstration of (a) an emotional state in the agent, and (b) a matching 
emotional state in the observer. As mentioned, one of the biggest challenges in 
assessing an emotional state is its valence dimension (e.g. Mendl et al., 2009, 
2010). This is an essential point relevant to emotional contagion research as 
studies often confound differences in arousal, measured by variations in 
physiology or attention, with differences in valence. This calls for more caution 
in the assignment of the presence of emotional contagion (Huber et al., 2017), 
and consequently its interpretation as an indicator of the presence of empathy (at 
least, in the view of the Russian doll model, Preston and de Waal, 2002). 
2.2.2.1. Variations in physiology. An early study on primate thermography 
demonstrates that chimpanzees who watch a conspecific being injected with a 
needle, or watch scenes of only the needle itself, show a decrease in skin 
temperature (but not when watching conspecifics in general agonism) (Parr, 
2001). Importantly, according to the authors this reflects a personal arousal 
rather than emotional contagion, which is supported by the chimpanzees’ 
aversive reactions during personal experiences with needles during veterinary 
visits. The development of wireless infrared thermography (Speakman and 
Ward, 1998) has allowed researchers to non-invasively measure body 
temperature in experimental settings without the need for restraint (Ioannou et 
al., 2015), and in natural environments where the use of electronic equipment is 
usually more limited. For instance, captive chimpanzees show a decrease in 
nasal temperature upon hearing and seeing conspecifics fighting (Kano et al., 
2016), and in a natural context, chimpanzees show a decrease in nasal 
temperature and an increase in ear temperature upon hearing conspecific’s 
aversive vocalisations (Dezecache et al., 2017). These temperature changes and 
their assumed link to positive or negative states are supported by thermography 
studies on emotional states without social context. For instance, studies tend to 
show an overall relation between negative emotional states and a decrease in 
nasal temperature (e.g. in humans, Ioannou et al., 2013; in rhesus monkeys, 
Macaca mulatta, Nakayama et al., 2005; in pigs, Boileau et al., 2019), though 
studies on positive states are less consistent (see Chotard et al., 2018, for an 
overview). Yet, there are also several discrepancies in the empirical data on 
facial temperature, which may be due to intricate facial area differences or 
different experimental stimuli used (Chotard et al., 2018). For example, a recent 
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study of three monkey species (Common marmosets, Callithrix jacchus, white-
throated capuchins, Cebus capucinus, and rhesus macaques, Macaca mulatta) 
and two ape species (Bornean gibbons, Hylobates muelleri, and western lowland 
gorillas) showed temperature differences between negative and positive 
conditions, with specific fluctuations for different facial areas (Chotard et al., 
2018). These fluctuations include for example a distinction between the nose 
bridge and the nose tip, due to a poorer or richer blood supply in these regions, 
respectively. The study shows that (induction of) negative states correlate with 
increased upper lip temperature, while (induction of) positive states correlate 
with a decrease in nose tip temperature and an increase in peri-orbital 
temperature. Still, the positive condition included two distinct behavioural 
contexts such as playing with a toy (all subjects except for gorillas) and being 
tickled (gorillas only). Upon removing the gorillas from the dataset, no thermal 
changes were found for the positive condition. This difference in thermal results 
highlights the importance of systematic research in the investigation of facial 
thermal imaging. Under this condition, the use of thermography to assess an 
emotional state, including establishing a state matching, may provide to be a 
useful approach. 
With regard to other physiological modalities, greylag geese (Anser anser) 
show an increase in heart rate upon seeing conspecifics in agonistic conflict 
(Wascher et al., 2008), but, for example, pigs show no difference in heart rate 
when watching their conspecifics being restrained (though, other markers show 
decreased locomotion, increased freezing, and increased attention) (Goumon 
and Špinka, 2016). While these reactions (e.g. decreased nasal temperature or 
increased heart rate) are consistent, in principle, with responding emotionally to 
a conspecific’s emotional state, they may also stem from aversive reactions to 
the context itself: Seeing or hearing a conflict (e.g. Kano et al., 2016; Dezecache 
et al., 2017; Wascher et al., 2008), in a similar fashion to seeing a needle (Parr, 
2001), may be associated with personal, negative memories. For this reason, 
rather than emotional contagion, contextual cues may have caused a negative 
emotional state (i.e. personal distress, see Table 1). For instance, a recent study 
in chimpanzees showed that upon watching a human experimenter with a 
(prosthetic) wound and (fake) blood, but without the experimenter behaviourally 
expressing pain, nasal temperature decreased (Sato et al., 2015). The authors 
suggest that chimpanzees may become (physiologically, rather than 
emotionally) aroused by the mere sight of injuries without the need for 
behavioural cues, which therefore excludes the notion of emotional contagion in 
this particular study. Consequently, this calls for caution when designing 
emotional contagion studies. We propose that the source or context of emotion 
induction in the demonstrating animal should be hidden from the observing 
animal, so that emotional contagion is based (only) on the expressions of the 
demonstrator, rather than the context (see also the description of “catching” of 
Concept 3 in Box 1). 
Other studies show physiological state matching measured through hormone 
levels. Female zebra finches (Taeniopygia guttata) respond with increased levels 
of corticosterone (and vocal responses) upon hearing their mates’ distress calls 
(Perez et al., 2015), and prairie voles (Microtus ochrogaster) show a matching 
of increased corticosterone levels (including anxiety- and fear-related 
behaviour) upon seeing their distressed mate (Burkett et al., 2016). Naïve 
zebrafish (Danio rerio) show a matching increase in cortisol levels as well, 
including vicarious antipredator behaviour, upon observing their conspecifics 
displaying that same behaviour (Oliveira et al., 2017; and see da Silva et al., 
2019 for familiarity effect). Notably, physiology-focused approaches contribute 
to a better understanding of emotional state-matching in animals. Yet, following 
the two emotional dimensions of valence and arousal, changes in physiology are 
not necessarily a sign of the presence of, or changes in, valence (see also the 
description of “physiological matching” of Concept 3 in Box 1). Accordingly, 
combining multiple components (e.g. Burkett et al., 2016; Oliveira et al., 2017) 
facilitates the interpretation of observed physiological changes. For example, 
upon seeing their chicks in distress, mother hens showed a range of 
physiological and behavioural changes including a decreased eye temperature, 
increased heart rate, decreased preening, increased attention, and maternal 
vocalizations (Edgar et al., 2011). The combination of multiple modalities is an 
essential aspect of this study and, in addition, the composition of these changes 
occurred specifically to the distress intervention (contrasted to three other 
experimental conditions). The latter helps to rule out a response to the context 
only (i.e. the source of distress was out of sight), or mere behavioural mimicry. 
Undeniably, though a multi-componential approach may be preferred, a 
diverse methodological approach is not always logistically feasible in 
experimental research, and certainly even less so in an ecologically valid setting 
(Dezecache et al., 2017). Furthermore, even with the benefits of an experimental 
design and the opportunity for multiple methods, the authors state themselves 
that “it is not possible from this study to conclusively differentiate between a 
non-evaluative behavioural and physiological response (akin, for example, to 
‘interest’ or ‘heightened attention’) and one that is accompanied by a valenced, 
emotional component (…)” (Edgar et al., 2011, p. 3133). We agree with this 
statement as far as that an additional verification of a valenced, emotional 
component is preferred in order to conclude the presence of an emotional state 
(see e.g. Chapter 2.2.2.3). Moreover, we commend this particular study in light 
of research on emotional contagion and other empathy-related phenomena in 
animals. The observation of a coordinated set of changes in different components 
underlies the definition of an emotional state (see the beginning of Chapter 
2.2.2.). As such, the data collection of this study (Edgar et al., 2011) aids greatly 
to better understand emotional responses in animals. 
2.2.2.2. Variations in attention. Parrots have been shown to be more active and 
attentive after hearing distress calls from conspecifics (versus a control sound of 
white noise), including a familiarity effect, although this effect is small and 
should be treated with caution (in cockatiels, Nymphicus hollandicus, Liévin-
Bazin et al., 2018). Similar findings have been reported for dogs, who showed 
increased alert and stress behaviour after hearing distress vocalizations (in 
contrast to non-conspecific sounds, Quervel-Chaumette et al., 2016). As the 
authors critically note themselves (Quervel-Chaumette et al., 2016), one could 
argue that the found increase in activity and attention in dogs, and thus also in 
the parrot study, rather reflects a general increase in vigilance toward 
conspecifics’ sounds, than an emotional response or a convergence of affective 
states. To tackle this limitation, another study implemented a broad set of 
experimental conditions and manipulations, which allowed the authors to 
exclude the alternative explanation of mere increased attention to conspecifics 
(Huber et al., 2017). After hearing isolation whines from conspecifics, dogs 
showed increased freezing and distress behaviours. The observation of 
behaviours associated with negative valence was interpreted as an emotional 
convergence between subjects, and the results certainly imply that the observing 
dogs had a particular reaction to the negative calls. Yet, the findings are not fully 
conclusive in terms of the valence component. Indeed, an alarm call may 
provoke intricate escape or freezing behaviour in an observing subject, without 
necessarily informing us on an accompanying emotional state (see for a 
discussion Pérez‐Manrique and Gomila, 2018). Future work on dogs could 
however benefit from this paradigm and add physiological parameters, as well 
as employing live demonstrator dogs, to display and measure the full extent of 
the potential emotional states and their contagion (such as seen in chickens, in 
Edgar et al., 2011; or in laboratory mice in Gonzalez-Liencres et al., 2014). 
Aside from (non-invasively) investigating changes in behaviour and 
physiology, additional methods for differentiating between valence and arousal 
include the use of functionally flexible events, behavioural lateralization, and 
facial expressions. Briefer (2018) suggests to use stimuli that are ‘functionally 
flexible’ to distinguish between different valences upon hearing conspecifics 
(Briefer, 2018, p. 7). For example, studies have shown that dogs may distinguish 
between different growl types (see e.g. Faragó et al., 2010a, 2010b; Molnár et 
al., 2009; Maros et al., 2008). In addition, a number of studies have investigated 
animal emotional lateralization, which suggests that cerebral lateralization (i.e. 
structural and functional hemispheric asymmetries, Bisazza et al., 1998) is 
linked to emotional processing in animals (see Bisazza et al., 1998 and Rogers, 
2002 for a review of lateralization in animals). Within this field two main 
hypotheses are investigated, which postulate that the right hemisphere should be 
J.E.C. Adriaense, et al. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 112 (2020) 62–82 
 
dominant for processing negative events or withdrawal, while the left 
hemisphere should be dominant for processing positive events or approach 
(Leliveld et al., 2013). For instance, when watching scenes of unfamiliar 
conspecifics in an aggressive conflict, chimpanzees show an increase in 
temperature of the right tympanic membrane (i.e. inner ear) (Parr and Hopkins, 
2000). Additionally, upon inspecting predators animals often show a left-eye 
preference, such as seen in common wall lizards (Podarcis muralis, Martin et al., 
2010) and in domestic hens and chicks (Evans et al., 1993; Dharmaretnam and 
Rogers, 2005); and, upon approaching predators, several fish species show a 
right-eye and left-hemisphere dominance (Bisazza et al., 1998), which is also 
observed in Australian magpies (Gymnorhina tibicen, Koboroff et al., 2008) (see 
Leliveld et al., 2013, for a review of the different hypotheses and current 
evidence). Lastly, there is a long tradition of using facial expressions, either 
explicitly or implicitly measured, to assess the valence of emotional responses 
in humans (Fridlund and Cacioppo, 1986), including facial EMG 
(electromyography) (e.g. Lamm et al., 2008; Hofelich and Preston, 2012). 
Another (fairly recent) avenue to measure animal emotional state, and in 
particular its valence, is thus the study of animal facial expressions. Differences 
in facial expressions have been found to convey aggressive intent as well as 
emotion-related information in pigs (Camerlink et al., 2018), to relate to a 
positive treatment (i.e. manual tickling) in rats by showing ear posture and 
colour differences (Finlayson et al., 2016), and several animal equivalents of the 
human FACS (Facial Action Coding system, Ekman et al., 2002) have been 
developed to objectively measure facial movement (see e.g. for chimpanzees, 
ChimpFACS, Parr et al., 2007; for horses, EquiFACS, Wathan et al., 2015; for 
cats, CatFACS, Caeiro et al., 2017; for dogs, DogFACS, Waller et al., 2013). In 
accordance with the multi-component model of emotions, facial expression 
measurement can be used as an additional component to build a full picture of 
the internal state of an animal (see e.g. Descovich et al., 2017 for a review of the 
current empirical data of animal facial expressions). These three additional 
methods provide interesting approaches for the further exploration of valence 
discrimination in emotional contagion studies. 
2.2.2.3. The cognitive bias approach and valence. An emotional state 
matching does not necessarily imply a matching of the same modality. For 
instance, freezing behaviour does not need to necessarily match with only 
(vicarious) freezing behaviour, but may be matched with other fear related 
components such as changes in physiology (e.g. heart rate), facial expression 
(e.g. ear posture), or potential lateralization (e.g. a left-eye inspection of the 
threating stimulus). Moreover, observing an alignment of expressions across 
different components may be empirically preferred in some cases. The display 
of mobbing behaviour in which an observer matches the mobbing behaviour of 
a demonstrator does not allow us to disentangle behavioural contagion from 
emotional contagion (see Chapter 2.2.1.). In contrast, if the behavioural match 
is accompanied by changes in other components and an additional measurement 
of valence is applied, researchers will be able to draw stronger conclusions on 
potential emotional contagion. To this end, it is important to explore the different 
components of an emotional state in order to widen the scope of potential 
measurements and, thus, to broaden the sources of information that may 
facilitate the interpretation of empirical data. 
In human psychology research, there is ample evidence of the interaction 
between emotions and cognitive processing. For example, people with anxiety 
tend to be more pessimistic and judge ambiguous sentences as more threatening 
(Eysenck et al., 1991), anticipate future events more negatively (MacLeod and 
Byrne, 1996), and show an attention bias for negative information (Mathews and 
MacLeod, 1994). Vice versa, people with less anxiety are more optimistic, and 
judge ambiguity more positively (Eysenck et al., 1991), and people with positive 
moods anticipate more positive events (Nygren et al., 1996) (see Paul et al., 
2005, for an extensive review of cognitive components in human emotions). 
Based on this evidence, researchers proposed that also in animals such 
interaction between emotion and cognition can be observed (see Paul et al., 
2005, for a review of a cognitive approach in animals). By analysing an animal’s 
cognitive performance (on for instance memory, attention, or decision-making 
tests), researchers may find biases (i.e. deviations) in this performance. The 
cognitive bias hypothesis predicts that these biases depend on an animal’s 
affective state, such that animals in a negative state should show more 
pessimistic biases in a given cognitive task, and animals in a positive state should 
show more optimistic biases (see Mendl et al., 2009, for a review of the 
literature). Concretely, a cognitive bias test consists of two phases in which 
animals first undergo a discrimination training of one cue with high reward 
certainty (i.e. the positive cue) and another cue with low certainty or even full 
absence of reward (i.e. the negative cue). Once animals learned this 
discrimination, the next phase introduces a new, ambiguous cue. The responses 
given to the ambiguous cue may be biased toward the responses given to either 
the negative or positive cue, which is then said to reflect an animal’s pessimistic 
or optimistic tendencies to how they perceive the ambiguous cue (see e.g. 
Bethell, 2015, for a review of the paradigm and its relation to measuring animal 
welfare). 
In the first scientific investigation of the bias hypothesis (Harding et al., 
2004), rats were trained to press a lever after hearing tone X in order to get a 
food reward (i.e. positive cue), and to refrain from pressing a lever after tone Y 
in order to avoid hearing white noise (i.e. negative cue). After this training, rats 
that had been housed in unpredictable circumstances (e.g. unfamiliar cage or 
reversal of light/dark cycle to induce a negative state) tended to respond less and 
with greater latency to presented ambiguous cues, in contrast to rats housed in a 
predictable environment (control group). Such slower response time reflects that 
the rats treated this ambiguous cue more similar to the negative cue, and, thus, 
had more pessimistic tendencies in their reward expectation (see Burman et al., 
2008, for a discussion of reward expectancy as an indicator of animal emotion). 
The cognitive bias test has repeatedly demonstrated consistent findings in both 
vertebrate (e.g. see Roelofs et al., 2016, for a critical review of the cognitive bias 
test and current evidence; see Baciadonna and McElligott, 2015, for the use of 
the bias test to measure welfare in farm animals) and invertebrate species (e.g. 
pessimism bias in honeybees, Apis mellifera carnica, Bateson et al., 2011; 
optimism bias in bumble bees, Bombus terrestris, Perry et al., 2016). 
The benefit of the cognitive bias paradigm is that changes in response to 
ambiguous cues can be predicted a priori, thus allowing a more theoretically 
motivated framework when studying emotions, and the paradigm may detect 
emotions not easily observed through overt behaviours. For this reason, a 
cognitive bias approach offers the opportunity to investigate an additional, 
valence oriented, component of an animal’s emotional state (Paul et al., 2005), 
therefore suggesting its application to study emotional contagion. This 
suggestion has been highlighted before (e.g. Edgar et al., 2012), but we find 
limited empirical examples of this approach (see Saito et al., 2016, in which 
positive and negative auditory playback in rats generates optimistic and, to a 
limited degree, pessimistic responses, respectively; see Sümegi et al., 2014, for 
an alternative approach of cognitive testing to assess stress in dogs and their 
owners). Recently, however, Adriaense et al. (2019a) implemented a cognitive 
bias approach to assess emotional contagion in common ravens. The animals 
underwent either a positive (i.e. removal of a low value food reward while being 
presented a high value reward) or negative (i.e. removal of the high value food 
while being shown the low value food) manipulation. As predicted, ravens 
showed increased attention and interest in the positive condition, and increased 
redirected behaviour (i.e. beak swipes through ground substrate) and left-eye use 
upon inspecting the remaining low value food in the negative condition. During 
this manipulation, these ravens (the demonstrators) were observed by their 
affiliative partners, the observers, who were naïve to either positive or negative 
condition of their partner. Before and after the demonstrator’s manipulation, 
observers were tested on a spatial judgment bias test. In this test, positive and 
negative cues were presented either left or right of the animal, and ambiguous 
cues in front of the animal. As hypothesized, observer ravens responded more 
pessimistically to ambiguous cues (i.e. increased latency to approach the cue) 
after having witnessed the demonstrator raven in the negative condition. 
By using the cognitive bias test, the possible occurrence of emotional 
contagion in ravens could be assessed by gathering information on the 
(matching) valence of their responses. This study also shows a matching of 
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different modalities, namely behaviour and cognition, which allows to 
differentiate emotional contagion from behavioural mimicry (see discussion 
above). Though in the present study assessment of additional components was 
not feasible, it remains important that future research continues to aim at 
working within the preferred multicomponent model, including the use of 
additional cognitive, physiological, and behavioural components for all tested 
animals (Adriaense et al., 2019b; Vonk, 2019b). The addition of a cognitive 
(bias) test, in conjunction with behavioural and physiological assessment, will 
strongly aid the empathy and emotional contagion field in more confidently 
establishing potential matches in the multiple components of emotional states. 
Although we currently cannot measure an animal’s conscious feeling(s) (and 
therefore cannot show that emotional contagion includes a ‘felt emotion’), we 
encourage researchers to embrace this route to investigate the valence of animal 
emotions. 
2.3. Summary of evidence on emotional contagion 
Overall, the direct demonstration of emotional contagion presents a tough 
challenge, and provides us with more intricacies than previously assumed from 
this ‘simple’ affective process. Evidence of emotional contagion in many species 
remains scarce, and there is a clear bias on negative emotions, and their 
contagion, in research (Boissy et al., 2007; Rozin and Royzman, 2001). Often 
measurements of behavioural contagion or motor mimicry are interpreted as 
emotional contagion, and changes in arousal or attention are interpreted as 
changes in valence. Although both behavioural contagion and arousal changes 
may form important components of emotional contagion, they are conceptually 
distinct and should be studied independently. Future work needs to disentangle 
these presumed components, and design experimental paradigms to overcome 
the aforementioned interpretive limitations. Furthermore, emotional contagion 
studies often lack a concrete definition and theoretical framework of an emotion, 
resulting in post-hoc interpretations. This can be resolved by working with a 
multi-component model. The multi-component nature of emotions has long been 
accepted (e.g. Anderson and Adolphs, 2014) and we therefore argue that it 
should be more systematically incorporated into the design of future studies. For 
one, this will increase the information input the observing animal is receiving by 
for example using a combination of auditory and visual cues within positive, 
negative, and control conditions (Baciadonna and McElligott, 2015). On the 
other side, a multicomponent approach allows us to combine multiple results to 
more accurately assess the presence of an emotional state (Paul et al., 2005). 
Importantly, the source of emotional contagion should specifically be the 
conspecific’s state, and not the context or any environmental cues (Baciadonna 
and McElligott, 2015). The event that induces a potential emotional state in the 
demonstrator should be concealed by means of a hidden mechanism or hidden 
construction, or by controlling for sound and odour (as proposed in e.g. Huber 
et al., 2017). Finally, we recommend the continued development of methods 
assessing valence, including further empirical validation of the use of a cognitive 
approach, such as the cognitive bias paradigm, within social emotion settings. 
3. Sympathy, consolation, and targeted helping 
3.1. Definitions and terminology 
Sympathy is, according to one (out of many) definitions “an emotional 
response, stemming from the apprehension of another’s emotional state of 
condition, that is not the same as the other’s state or condition but consists of 
feelings of sorrow or concern for the other” (Eisenberg et al., 1991, p. 65). 
Hence, while empathy is generally described as feeling with (or as) the other, 
sympathy is usually framed as feeling for the other (see also Table 1 for 
definitions, and Box 2 for opposing views). Neuroanatomical research supports 
this distinction and brain networks involved in empathy are mostly separate from 
those involved in compassion or sympathetic care for others (Ashar et al., 2017; 
Singer and Klimecki, 2014, and Lamm et al., 2019, for review). Furthermore, 
sympathy generally implies not only being concerned about the other’s 
emotional state, but also motivating subsequent prosocial action. Indeed, 
orientation from self-focused emotion(s) (such as in emotional contagion) to the 
other’s emotion(s) is often an essential element for prosociality. It would not be 
very efficient to feel as the other, rather than for, in order to help or console 
someone in distress. For instance, affect matching (i.e. emotional contagion) 
without otheroriented concern can easily result in egocentric or personal distress 
(Batson et al., 1997; Eisenberg and Fabes, 1992; Decety and Lamm, 2009), and 
a cognitive representation of the other’s emotional state alone may result in cold 
disregard, schadenfreude, or strategic self-oriented behaviour (Batson, 1991; 
Davis, 2015; see also FeldmanHall et al., 2015). Moreover, research in 
psychopathic offenders shows that emotional contagion and perspective-taking 
can both occur without increase in prosocial behaviour (e.g. Pfabigan et al., 
2015; Keysers and Gazzola, 2014; Decety, 2015). In addition, not all forms of 
prosociality require affect based sympathy, such as object or food sharing, in 
which the motivation is more materialistically, rather than emotionally grounded 
(Paulus, 2014, 2018; Dunfield et al., 2011; note, though, that according to the 
Russian doll model such sharing is assumed to be emotionally based, de Waal, 
2008) (see extensive discussion below and Chapter 3.2.2.). 
In the Russian doll model of animal empathy (Preston and de Waal, 2002; 
de Waal, 2008), sympathetic concern comprises the middle layer building up on 
the core of affect matching. The authors propose that sympathetic concern does 
not require fully represented self-other distinction, only a separation between 
own, internally generated, emotions and externally generated emotions (de 
Waal, 2008). It is further proposed that sympathetic concern is based on 
emotional contagion (de Waal and Preston, 2017; de Waal, 2008), and requires 
self-regulation (de Waal, 2008), which is consistent with the scientific evidence 
in developmental human research (Eisenberg and Eggum, 2009). Sympathetic 
concern is considered to be found in expressions of consolation, and when 
sympathetic concern is associated with cognitive perspective taking, it allows 
for prosocial behaviour that is more accurate to the other’s particular 
predicament, such as in targeted helping. Thus, the Russian doll model connects 
sympathetic concern to subsequent prosocial behaviour with more or less 
accurate understanding. Understanding another’s state may indeed drive us to 
act, whether this takes the shape of consolation or helping, and thus, the 
proposed linear structure from sympathy to prosociality seems logical. Both the 
Russian doll model and the combination model assume an emotional basis for 
consolation, but, while the Russian doll model also entails the basic assumption 
of an emotional basis in the form of emotional contagion for targeted helping, 
this phenomenon in the combination model can be described and studied 
independently of its supposedly required affect matching (Yamamoto, 2017). 
Based on the research discussed at the beginning of this paragraph, we think that 
sympathy ought to be conceptualized as an independent, affect-based 
phenomenon, and sympathy may drive us to perform certain types of emotion-
based helping and consolation. Yet, as we will discuss, not all examples of 
(targeted) helping or prosociality are affect-based, or require a necessary base of 
emotional contagion, which is in accordance with the combination model 
(Yamamoto, 2017). We will now discuss in the next chapters how sympathy is 
measured through consolation and targeted helping. 
3.2. Measuring sympathy through consolation and targeted helping 
Sympathy in animals is assessed by studying forms of prosocial behaviour 
that might plausibly indicate other-oriented concern, cognitive perspective 
taking, or both. In this paper we will not summarize studies on animals' 
perspective taking skills in general (see e.g. in primates, Burkart and Heschl, 
2007; in dogs, Catala et al., 2017; in birds, Lambert et al., 2018; see also Massen 
et al., 2019); instead, we discuss the oft-used indicators of such skills in relation 
to sympathy. Targeted helping is one such indicator, and experimental 
paradigms are often constructed to assess this. Their rationale is that helping 
requires cognitive perspective taking, in addition to other-oriented concern, 
because the helper has to understand the other’s need from their own perspective, 
in order to choose the appropriate helping action (de Waal, 2008). A second 
behavioural indicator of other-oriented concern is comforting/consoling 
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behaviour. Consolation is defined as unsolicited offering of positive, affective 
behaviour to another individual that has been a target of aggression (de Waal 
and van Roosmalen, 1979). Since its early description in chimpanzees, this topic 
has taken an iconic position in animal empathy research (empathy broadly 
defined as in the Russian doll model) and it has become the prime example of 
inferring the presence of sympathy (de Waal, 2008; Palagi et al., 2014b; Romero 
et al., 2010; Clay et al., 2018). The reason for its iconic status is that it is thought 
to be a clear case of other-oriented response, which aims to improve the 
recipient’s welfare and, to do so, the subject must be able to suppress its own 
initial, vicarious emotional state. We will now discuss and comment on several 
critical aspects in current consolation and targeted helping research. In our view, 
the main issue is that reports of consolation or helping are often precipitately 
taken to be evidence of sympathy in animals (or as evidence for empathy, 
broadly defined). Yet, upon our review of the literature, one should critically 
scrutinize the involvement of an emotional-based mechanism in the observed 
behaviours. 
3.2.1. Mechanisms and functions of consolation 
Based on carefully recorded data from post-conflict interactions in 
comparison to a baseline of affiliative behaviour, consolation has been 
documented extensively in great apes and some species of monkeys (reviewed 
in Clay et al., 2018; Pérez‐Manrique and Gomila, 2018). Primate consolation 
indeed appears sympathy- or emotionally-based, as it is morphologically highly 
similar to what humans do when consoling a distressed other. Depending on the 
species’ behavioural repertoire, consolation typically involves gentle touching, 
hugging, kissing, or grooming. It is also perceived by the recipient to be 
consoling, as indicated by reduced recipient distress - at least in some cases 
(Romero et al., 2010; Fraser et al., 2008; Palagi and Norscia, 2013), albeit not in 
all (Koski and Sterck, 2007; McFarland and Majolo, 2012). Furthermore, young 
individuals that have better self-regulatory skills offer consolation to others more 
often (Clay and de Waal, 2013b), and consolation is often biased to close 
partners (i.e. familiarity bias, see e.g. Clay and de Waal, 2013a; Palagi and 
Norscia, 2013). These aspects speak for processes that are more easily invoked 
by in-group members and involve control of a subject’s own emotional state, 
other-oriented concern for another’s emotional state, and the subsequent 
prosocial behavioural response. The existence of a familiarity bias has been 
suggested as evidence for an affect-based mechanism (e.g. Campbell and de 
Waal, 2011), and has been labelled as an expression of empathy (broadly 
defined) (e.g. Palagi et al., 2009). Indeed, several studies on consolation, helping 
(see below), emotional contagion, and mimicry (see above), show that 
expression of the involved behaviour is increased by the quality of the 
relationship (Preston and Hofelich, 2012). Yet, findings of such a bias provide 
indirect evidence of emotion-based, or sympathy-driven, behaviour, rather than 
direct confirmation, as a familiarity bias is usually not empirically investigated 
for its emotional basis. Additionally, comparative research shows that the 
familiarity effect is dependent on the levels of stress one experiences from 
interacting with strangers (Martin et al., 2015). Unfamiliar partners experience 
more social stress in their interaction, yet, by blocking the endocrine stress 
response, emotional contagion can be evoked in stranger pairs, in both mice and 
humans (and vice versa, stress induction impairs emotional contagion in familiar 
dyads). Thus, rather than an emotional ‘connection’ between familiar pairs 
(Palagi et al., 2009), it seems that the experience of social stress may (partially) 
modulate the familiarity bias. Based on this evidence, the familiarity account as 
evidence for an emotion-based mechanism in observations of either mimicry, 
emotional contagion, helping, or consolation, is questionable, to the least. 
Research in rooks (Corvus frugilegus, Seed et al., 2007; Logan et al., 2013), 
ravens (Fraser and Bugnyar, 2010, 2011), jackdaws (Corvus monedula, Logan 
et al., 2013), and budgerigars (Melopsittacus undulates, Ikkatai et al., 2016) 
demonstrate post-conflict behaviour similar to the consolatory behaviour shown 
in primates. Dogs, too, have been shown to express affiliative behaviour toward 
the victim of a conflict, as well as between former opponents (Cools et al., 2008). 
Further evidence is recorded in for example horses (Equus caballus, Cozzi et al., 
2010), prairie voles (Burkett et al., 2016), and bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops 
truncatus, Yamamoto et al., 2015). While such behavioural interactions have 
been labelled as consolation, we still do not know the exact mechanism(s) of 
these behaviours, and whether they are indeed equivalent across species. The 
requirement for the subject to suppress its own emotional state to show 
(sympathy-based) other-oriented concern is particularly problematic in the light 
of the available data. Upon perceiving both a crying and a neutral person, dogs 
show more approach and touch towards the crying person, regardless of the 
person’s position as owner or stranger (Custance and Mayer, 2012). The authors 
argue that if the approach was self-oriented, dogs would rather approach their 
owner to find comfort for their own (potentially) distressed state, which was not 
found. Yet, the data at hand cannot exclude the authors’ final conclusion 
(Custance and Mayer, 2012), which is that the results may imply an adaptation 
in dogs to approach crying humans in return for a rewarding and affiliative 
response, instead of expressing concern. In prairie voles the subject, who 
observes its distressed mate from behind a transparent barrier, has increased 
cortisone levels which match the recipient’s distressed state (interpreted as 
emotional contagion, see above). Yet, when the pair is in full contact, and the 
subject directs consolatory contact to its mate, cortisone levels are not increased 
(Burkett et al., 2016). This may imply that the other’s distress serves as a causal 
factor for consolation, through means of emotional contagion. Nevertheless, this 
does not include that the voles have (or require) a cognitive representation or 
understanding of the other’s state, nor that consolation occurs due to a switch 
from self- to other-oriented concern (Vasconcelos et al., 2012). As discussed 
above, experiencing congruent affective states may result in self-focused 
distress, and, thus, observed consolation may arise due to the motivation to 
decrease one’s own distress, rather than to ameliorate the other’s distress. Thus 
far, validating this hypothesis has been problematic as there is almost no data 
available on the relevant physiological parameters. In the only intra-species dog 
study on consolation it was shown that the subjects, after being exposed to 
familiar dog whines (vs. stranger whines), expressed more affiliative behaviour 
to their familiar conspecifics (Quervel-Chaumette et al., 2016). However, 
playback of familiar whines maintained (the already) high levels of cortisol in 
contrast to a reduction of cortisol in the stranger whines condition. Because in 
the familiar condition the cortisol levels did not change, in comparison to 
baseline, it remains difficult to disentangle the effect of the familiar whines. 
Therefore, it is entirely possible that the consoler and the target are both 
distressed, and the actor is merely comforting itself by seeking physical comfort, 
though, this does not exclude that the act of giving comfort (and subsequently 
perceiving it to be comforting to the other) may in itself be comforting to the 
consoler. In this regard, the self-focused benefit of comforting another may not 
always be so easily dissociated from the other-focused benefit. The problem of 
the actor potentially merely comforting itself has been long recognized. First, 
one might argue that it would be safer not to seek contact with the victim of 
aggression, as the victim might show unpredictable retaliation or redirect 
aggression to the consoler. This risk may be rather small, though, as research in 
chimpanzees and mandrills shows that providing comforting behaviour to others 
actually decreases the risk of receiving redirected aggression as compared to 
other bystanders (see Koski and Sterck, 2009; Schino and Marini, 2012). 
Second, it has been noted that the consolers do not appear distressed (de Waal 
and Aureli, 1996), but thus far there is no quantitative data on the consolers’ 
emotional state prior to consolation. It may well be that an affiliative contact 
would not be effective in comforting the consoler. Bonobo victims receiving 
spontaneous consolation from a bystander show reduced distress, yet, when 
victims receive consolation after initiating it themselves, their distress does not 
reduce (Palagi and Norscia, 2013). This suggests that the actual affiliative act 
does not effectively comfort the victim, but that it is rather the spontaneous 
gesture by the bystander. Indirectly, this also suggests that a bystander aiming 
to comfort itself by consolation would not experience alleviation of distress by 
the affiliative act. Yet, without additional data (e.g. physiological measurements) 
the motivation of other-regard rather than self-regard cannot be unambiguously 
shown. Interestingly, in the human literature, there has been an extensive debate 
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on this topic and numerous experimental attempts still result in an insufficient 
resolution on whether prosocial behaviour is indeed triggered by sympathetic 
concern, or rather by attempts to reduce personal distress (e.g., Batson et al., 
1988; Decety and Lamm, 2009, for review). Furthermore, the occurrence of 
consolation is difficult to distinguish from similarly looking behaviour that 
occurs in the same context, but has another function altogether, presumably 
relying on a different mechanism (Fraser et al., 2009). For example, a consoler 
can actually be diverting the threat of spreading aggression away from him- or 
herself (Koski and Sterck, 2009; Logan et al., 2013), thereby reducing the 
general likelihood of further aggression (Schino and Marini, 2012; Yamamoto 
et al., 2015), or using affiliation to reconcile the previously occurred conflict on 
behalf of a relative or friend (Wittig et al., 2007). These cases may nevertheless 
appear behaviourally highly similar to a consolatory contact, although their 
ultimate function is different. It is therefore entirely possible that the prevalence 
or the spread of sympathy-driven consolation within and across species is 
overestimated. 
3.2.2. The emotional and cognitive basis of helping 
Targeted helping does not necessarily require any emotional basis, and 
therefore may not irrevocably be based on sympathy or any affective-based 
concept related to empathy. As a result, interpreting helping behaviour in light 
of sympathy-driven mechanisms is problematic when the context does not 
require any emotional basis (e.g. food- or object-related helping, see discussion 
below). Whether or not sympathy is a necessary and sufficient mechanism likely 
depends on the emotional content of the situation (Hoffman, 2000), and helping 
may therefore often involve an emotional basis (though, empirical verification 
may be missing, see discussion below). In regards of targeted helping without a 
necessary emotional basis, chimpanzees have been shown to hand an appropriate 
tool or another out-of-reach object to another (Yamamoto et al., 2009, 2012; 
Bullinger et al., 2014; Liebal et al., 2014), or release a latch that delivers or 
grants access to food to another (Warneken and Tomasello, 2006; Warneken et 
al., 2007; Melis and Tomasello, 2013). Similar helping was shown by tufted 
capuchin monkeys (Barnes et al., 2008). It is debatable whether targeted helping 
by handing a tool to another individual has to be grounded in a sympathy-based 
response to another’s emotional state, which in turn would motivate subsequent 
prosocial behaviour. That is, these contexts of handing a tool require the subject 
to understand the other’s need, and therefore may involve (some) cognitive 
perspective taking. However, we assume that these types of helping are less 
likely to involve any particular affective component, and it is therefore not 
necessary to sympathize with another’s affective state to engage in targeted 
helping (Yamamoto, 2017). Indeed, a study on the four great ape species’ 
helping in an object-transfer paradigm found that observing the recipient being 
harmed does not motivate apes’ helping behaviour (Liebal et al., 2014). Such 
cases of targeted helping are more likely to be based on the subject representing 
the material goal of the other, rather than their affective state (Yamamoto, 2017). 
The action obviously provides help to the recipient and requires, therefore, the 
motivation to do so, but that motivation does not need to stem from sympathy. 
Additionally, as Silk argues in a recent review of the evolution of altruistic 
behaviour (Silk and House, 2016), prosocial choices in chimpanzees and other 
great apes seem to be based on self-interest rather than on benefitting others (see 
also Silk et al., 2005, in which the authors argue that chimpanzees are not 
motivated by other-related concern; and Silk et al., 2013 for the many reasons 
of food sharing). In human research, scholars have argued that prosocial 
behaviour is motivated by a concern for others (e.g. in children, Hepach et al., 
2013), which is supported by the presence of internal arousal acting as motivator 
for prosocial behaviour (arousal as measured by pupil dilation, see Hepach et 
al., 2015). Though, others have argued for the absence of such other-concern. In 
developing children, targeted helping, sharing, and comforting distressed others, 
are unrelated to each other (Paulus, 2018; Dunfield and Kuhlmeier, 2013). 
Moreover, in young children, targeted helping may rather reflect an interest in 
joint action and in completing a goal rather than sympathy per se (Paulus, 2014; 
Dahl and Paulus, 2018). This is corroborated by studies showing that distinct 
neurophysiological patterns characterize these forms of prosociality (Paulus et 
al., 2013; Malti and Dys, 2018). Additionally, genetic analyses also suggest that 
helping and comforting are not genetically related, and that their association in 
adults is rather due to environmental factors (Knafo-Noam et al., 2018). 
In addition to food- or object-related helping, apes are reported to perform 
helpful actions that occur in highly emotionally charged situations. Indeed, de 
Waal (2008) describes sympathy-based helping to be particularly apparent in 
care or rescue behaviour. There are several anecdotal cases of chimpanzees 
helping others even at great risk to themselves (see Pérez‐Manrique and Gomila, 
2018, for review; Koski and Sterck, 2010; de Waal, 2008, 2010). Examples 
include helping another individual that has fallen into water and who appears in 
great distress, where the helper is in danger as apes generally cannot swim. Such 
context evokes highly charged emotions, and the helper must recognize the 
specific goal of the other and the appropriate actions to help him. This case is, 
thus, likely to involve all components of sympathy-based, cognitively processed 
action, such as a cognitive representation of the other’s state and situation, and 
other-oriented concern that motivates the subsequent prosocial action. Examples 
of care behaviour involve others showing care and compassion toward a 
wounded individual, or helping an incapacitated individual to move (e.g. 
Boesch, 1992; reviewed in Pérez‐Manrique and Gomila, 2018; Pruetz, 2011; see 
e.g. also in elephants, Bates et al., 2008; in dolphins, reviewed by Pérez‐
Manrique and Gomila, 2018). These cases certainly suggest a cognitively 
processed understanding of the other’s need. Problematically, however, the 
behaviours mentioned are notoriously difficult to observe systematically (e.g. 
see Hammers and Brouwer, 2017, for the first evidence of rescue behaviour 
observed in birds), and ethically impossible to study experimentally. Therefore, 
such cases are anecdotally recorded, rendering the evidence as tentative at best. 
Another problematic issue is that experimental studies sometimes fail to 
overcome a potentially anthropomorphic perspective (see also Williams et al., 
this Special Issue). For instance, in one study dogs did not seek the help of 
another human when their owner was stuck under a bookcase (Macpherson and 
Roberts, 2006). Rather than considering this as evidence of an absence of 
targeted helping in dogs, numerous alternative explanations could be offered. 
The subjects potentially may not have perceived the owner as being in distress, 
and even if they did, they may not have understood the need for another human 
to alleviate the pain, including the lack of human-specific experience with 
furniture and relevant physical cognition and/or causal reasoning abilities. 
Yet, even with a systematic and controlled experimental design we may 
conclude that helping does not always irrevocably carry an emotional basis. In 
this regard, studies of rodents' helping behaviour are also somewhat problematic 
in terms of identifying the underlying mechanisms, and whether they are indeed 
sympathy-related (e.g. see Vasconcelos et al., 2012 for rescue behaviour without 
any necessary ‘empathy’ related interpretation). Several studies have shown 
helping in highly emotionally charged situations, such as rats releasing a 
distressed conspecific from a restraining tube (Bartal et al., 2011; and see Bartal 
et al., 2014, for a familiarity bias), or rats releasing conspecifics being trapped 
in water (Sato et al., 2015). In these studies, the helping behaviour was claimed 
to be empathically motivated (based on the Russian doll model, Preston and de 
Waal, 2002), but others have argued against such notion (see Silberberg et al., 
2014, and Ueno et al., 2019, who argue for a social-contact account; and see 
Schwartz et al., 2017, who argue against an empathy-driven release in Sato et 
al., 2015). The emotional context and the familiarity bias suggest an emotional 
or sympathy related response (though see our discussion above on familiarity 
bias), but we do not currently know whether this involves cognitive perspective 
taking (as targeted helping is assumed to coincide with perspective taking in 
both the Russian doll model and the combination model) and, if so, at what level. 
It would be worth assessing, how far situational familiarity and own experience 
suffice in eliciting helping behaviour (Atsak et al., 2011). This does not imply 
that the observed behaviour cannot be prosocial in its action, still, the claim that 
this behaviour is underpinned by sympathetic concern or, more generally, an 
affective mechanism, seems premature (see also Carrillo et al., 2019, for recent 
work on emotional mirror neurons in rats). Regarding the role of self-regulation 
of emotions, rats' helping behaviour is impaired by anxiolytic treatment, 
indicating that helping requires an aroused emotional state (Bartal et al., 2016). 
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Thus, this may imply that the distressed state of the conspecific triggers 
(personal) distress in the helper, which suggests that the observed helping 
behaviour is perhaps based on the motivation to alleviate one’s own distress. 
Overall, it remains an open question whether the rodent evidence confirms that 
helping in rats is indeed sympathy-based. 
Current research on consolation and helping seems to share a similar 
problem, which is that often similarly looking behaviours are labelled 
consolation or helping, respectively, when little is known about their 
mechanisms and ultimate function (such as also seen in other social behaviours, 
e.g. in grooming, which functionally serves either maintaining social bonds or 
gaining resources, Wooddell et al., 2019). The different contexts in which 
consolation and helping behaviour are perceived highlight the importance of 
disentangling the different drivers that may underlie these behaviours. Dennett 
(1989) has argued for the investigation of different levels of intentionality and, 
as such, studying consolation and helping in animals could benefit from the 
empirical investigation of the intentionality levels. That is, we ought to verify 
which intention underlies the observed behaviour, such as the intention to avoid 
future harassment, to consolidate reproduction success by helping group mates, 
to improve the wellbeing of the other, or whether it concerns a reflexive reaction 
to relieve one’s own personal distress. This approach to scrutinize the 
mechanisms of animal behaviour by using and re-evaluating Dennett’s levels of 
intentionality has been applied to primate communication (see Townsend et al., 
2017 and references therein). Another interesting paper comparing helping 
behaviour in rats and ants, labelled rescue behaviour, proposes concrete 
suggestions in this vein (Hollis and Nowbahari, 2013). The authors recommend 
a focus on proximate mechanisms by analysing in an algorithmic manner the 
different behavioural patterns that come about in perceived rescue behaviour. 
Additionally, another focus should be on the ultimate level of this behaviour 
with an ecological approach. In that perspective, a framework of rat and mouse 
behavioural ecology would be relevant in the study of helping behaviour, to 
understand more how and why certain helping behaviour is expressed 
(Kondrakiewicz et al., 2019). We argue that the same recommendations could 
be beneficial in future consolation research. 
3.2.3. The relevance of cognitive complexity 
Consolation was long thought to be dependent on representational mental 
skills. Data of its occurrence in chimpanzees, bonobos, and gorillas (Romero et 
al., 2010; Koski and Sterck, 2007, 2009; Clay and de Waal, 2013a, 2013b; 
Cordoni et al., 2006) was contrasted with absence of evidence in monkeys 
(Aureli and de Waal, 2000). However, absence of evidence does not amount to 
evidence of absence. Moreover, spontaneously offered affiliative contacts by a 
conflict bystander to the former victim (and aggressor), have now been recorded 
in stump-tailed macaques (Call et al., 2002), Tonkean macaques (Macaca 
tonkeana, Palagi et al., 2014a, 2014b), Barbary macaques (McFarland and 
Majolo, 2012), and mandrills (Mandrillus sphinx, Schino and Marini, 2012). 
Furthermore, the requirement of advanced cognitive skills for consolation is not 
consistent with the early emergence of consolatory contacts in human infants. 
Human infants usually begin to show other-oriented concern before their first 
birthday (Hay et al., 1981; RothHanania et al., 2011; Davidov et al., 2013), 
which expands to active comforting of others at 14–18 months of age by patting, 
hugging or offering objects of comfort (Knafo et al., 2008; Hoffman, 2000; 
ZahnWaxler et al., 1992a, 1992b; Vaish et al., 2009). This is much before their 
theory of mind skills allow cognitive perspective taking. Thus, consolation does 
not appear to require particularly highly advanced mentalizing. Other 
researchers (e.g. Burkett et al., 2016) have noted that despite the general 
assumption of consolation requiring higher complex cognitive skills, rodents 
also demonstrate empathy-related phenomena (see consolation in prairie voles, 
Burkett et al., 2016). In a similar vein, helping may not require high cognitive 
capacities either, at least if the context is salient and the required action within 
the species’ behavioural repertoire. Without arguing for or against a notion of 
cognitive complexity in rodents, the combination model (Yamamoto, 2017) 
might allow us to explore and investigate consolation and helping in animals in 
a broader and more feasible manner than the doll model (Preston and de Waal, 
2002), as the latter does require a necessary advanced cognitive capacity for 
these phenomena (though note that more recently in de Waal and Preston, 2017, 
it is mentioned that “There is no a priori reason to exclude perspective-taking in 
smaller-brained species”, p. 2). Though the combination model does not 
explicitly posit an increasing cognitive complexity alongside ‘higher forms of 
empathy’ such as the doll model does, the phenomena sympathy and consolation 
are nevertheless held against a ‘cognitive complex’ standard and “Animal 
species showing phenomena in the category of the combination of plural factors 
should be inevitably talented (…) “(Yamamoto, 2017, p. 7). Such standard 
implies the notion that human empirical data serve as a benchmark to which 
animal data should be compared, which in our view goes against the idea of 
investigating empathic phenomena for their ecological value (e.g. Hollis and 
Nowbahari, 2013). Nevertheless, future research is certainly required to hone in 
on consolation and targeted helping in a diverse set of species, including the 
investigation of their underlying mechanisms and different components such as 
by means of physiological methods. This will reveal any potential linkages with 
either other concepts, or specific cognitive or social skills. 
3.3. Summary 
We propose that the interpretation of consolation and targeted helping as 
sympathy- or emotion-based, at the current stage, is not fully warranted. 
Primates and some other species exhibit behaviour suggesting other-oriented 
concern, but oftentimes we do not actually know the mechanisms involved, nor 
is the function of the observed behaviour well understood. The aforementioned 
forms of consolation and targeted helping could, in certain contexts, be indeed 
based on sympathetic concern – still, we need to consider that the same outcome 
can be based on different mechanisms. Helping another could be emotionally 
neutral or, alternatively, highly emotionally laden in for example a context of 
high urgency or threat. Most cases of helping are likely to involve at least some 
cognitive representation of the other's state and situation, but that does not need 
to be associated with an emotional reaction. Comforting, in contrast, occurs by 
definition in an emotional context. Care behaviour, in turn, could be based on 
personal curiosity or concern for the other's welfare, or both. By examining 
behaviour alone, we can never have full access to the proximate mechanisms. 
Therefore, it is of crucial importance to find out which ways may access the 
mechanisms, before drawing direct parallels between similar looking behaviours 
in different situations and species. We recommend that future research on 
consolation and targeted helping puts additional emphasis on the assessment of 
the physiological correlates of behaviour. Undeniably, measuring such 
parameters is often highly challenging and not always feasible. The majority of 
physiological applications has been designed for experimental research, though, 
in recent years applications have been developed to allow for more flexible use. 
For instance, animals can be trained to wear heart rate tracking equipment (e.g. 
in chickens, Buijs et al., 2018), so data can be collected without the need for 
restraint. Contexts of observational research and ecologically valid 
environments form even bigger challenges, yet, the recent development of for 
instance infrared thermography holds the potential to bring physiological 
measurements more efficiently to the field (e.g. Dezecache et al., 2017). In this 
regard, studies on all three concepts, emotional contagion, consolation, and 
targeted helping, can benefit from adding the physiological component to their 
methodological repertoire. Additionally, evidence shows that the capacity for 
consolation and targeted helping may not necessarily require advanced 
mentalizing skills, which future work should take into consideration upon 
reviewing empirical data in light of current theoretical empathy models. 
4. Conclusions 
As a returning topic in our review on the comparative study of empathy 
related phenomena in animals, we notice an absence of the assessment of an 
emotional basis, be it in emotional contagion, or in presumably sympathy-based 
behaviour, such as consolation or targeted helping. Yet, for both humans and 
animals, we need to verify the presence of an emotional response in order to 
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conclude the phenomenon itself, or even empathy. We propose to follow the 
idea of Pérez‐Manrique and Gomila (2018, p. 18), that “simple mechanisms can 
lead to responses and outcomes very similar to those expected for empathic 
behaviours but this does not mean that they are the same“. Adopting a multi-
component approach that also includes valence related measurements should 
serve as a potential solution for assessing the emotional basis of empathy-related 
phenomena. Furthermore, the underlying mechanisms and the ultimate function 
of the discussed phenomena require more systematic investigation. This 
knowledge would positively aid us in disentangling distinct phenomena in 
animals, hence facilitating the accurate labelling of observed behaviours and 
other parameters. After reviewing the current empirical evidence, we come to 
conclude that there is still a strong need for more comparative research, across 
different taxa, and with a focus on more methodical and rigorous study 
construction that allows to exclude more parsimonious explanations. In the same 
vein, some of the most exciting study designs (e.g. Reimert et al., 2017), and 
essential conceptual contributions (Mendl et al., 2010) come from the animal 
welfare field. The study on emotions and empathy in animals has in the last 
decade positively stimulated cross-domain collaborations, yet, a consolidation 
of fundamental and applied scientific practices often remains less explored. 
Hereby, we also call for fostering such a multi-discipline perspective. Although 
caution should be exerted when interpreting animal behaviour, 
anthropomorphism – defined as the attribution of human properties to nonhuman 
entities – can serve legitimate scientific purposes if it is used to develop 
hypotheses (Bekoff et al., 2002). Such hypotheses, emerging from data sources 
including our own perceptions, feelings, and detailed behavioural descriptions, 
are useful if collected for heuristic purposes, that is, if they can be tested 
rigorously (see also Williams et al., this Special Issue). For example, while 
owners readily report empathy-like responding in their pet dogs, systematic 
empirical confirmation remains elusive (Silva and de Sousa, 2011; Huber et al., 
2017). 
Although our review shows that current empirical evidence for various 
empathy-related phenomena is scarcer than perhaps assumed, we should not be 
discouraged to push through, unravel, and rigorously analyse the different and 
essential components of each discussed phenomenon. Nor do we conclude that 
empathy in animals is a naïve or unrealistic concept; on the contrary, our genuine 
interest in animals and their behaviour strengthens and encourages us to review 
our current understanding of the proximate mechanisms underlying their social 
behavioural repertoire. With this review we want to galvanize a critical 
perspective while at the same time remaining broad-minded of animals’ multi-
layered social and emotional complexity. 
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